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ABSTRACI: 
My thesis attempts, in the first instance to ascertain whether Islamic 
legal theory (ufiil} has made provisions for the accommodation of chang-
ing social exigencies. If such provisions have heen made, are they ade-
quately employed to achieve optimum benefit? 
In the second instance, the Islamic judicial process of discovering and 
formulating the Divine law and the elements that contribute towards it 
is subjected to scrutiny to ascertain whether it is proceeding according 
to the general provisions made for it in terms of the principles of the 
law or, whether this crucial process has since been abandoned, cor-
rupted, distorted or replaced. I have chosen four representitive classical 
works of u~ul al-fiqh on which to base my assessment of uiiil vis-a-vis 
changing social exigency. One of the works is a Shafi ('i exposition; the 
second two are Hanafi expositions, and the fourth is a general exposi-
tion not located in a particular legal school (madhhab).After illustrat-
ing the inherent leeways to be found in the legal propositions together 
with the inherent scope accompanying the notions of ma~la{zah (utility) 
and curf (prevailing norms), I proceed to evaluate the extent to which 
these leeways are employed in the actual judicial process of two of the 
world's most authoritative judicial institutions namely; al-Azhar 
(Cairo) and Darul cUlum (Deoband). lh do this, I analyze the fatwa 
(judicial decree) on organ transplantation from both these institutions. 
My analysis is not aimed at the outcome of the fatwahs, but rather at 
the processes involved in arriving at the particular verdicts. 
In my conclusion I point to the ample provisions made by legal theory 
to contend with any social exigency and to the tragic neglect of their 
employment in the application of the law to novel situations. It is, 
therefore, the inconsistency between the provisions of legal theory and 
the absence of their application in the actual judicial process that has 
contributed to the current tension between law and social change. 
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION. 
Many Arabic words are simply not translatable into English because 
they may connote a different meaning from what is intended by the 
original Arabic. It is for this reason that Arabic words are transliterated 
into the Latin alphabet. However, the majority of transliterated words 
which carry no diacritical marks are prone to mispronunciation and 
misaccentuation. Faulty translation can only be remedied through a 
standard system of transliteration. 
A full presentation of the Arabic alphabet and its transliteration sym-
bols are present on the next page. 
I have followed a standard system of non-phonetic transliteration with 
slight variations. Names which begin with the article "al" have been used 
uniformly without distinction between the so-called "shamshi" and 
"qaman'' categories, such as, al-Razi instead of ar Razi. The ta' mar-
butah is indicated by the 'h' ,as for example, ma~la!zah instead of ma~-
la~a or ma~lal}at. The Arabic titles and the authors of English works 
are not transliterated. Names of places that have been anglicized, such 
as, Damascus (Dimashq), have not been transliterated. 
iii 
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Introduction. 
One is often confronted with the question as to how Islamic law faces 
the undeniable challenge of the perpetual process of change without 
having to sacrifice any of its authenticity at the alter of change. How is 
it feasible that a single body of law continues to maintain its position as 
a means of sound ordering in a highly sophisticated world of computer 
technology, a world of rapid movement, and exploding urban popula-
tions, in the same manner it formerly did in the widely different condi-
tions of ancient agricultural, pastoral, desert dwelling rural societies? 
What is the secret and magical formula that allows a body of legal 
principles and its implications to maintain such an effective and efficient 
ordering both in primitive rural and in modern urban civilizations? Is 
this magical power located in the "immutable" and rigid character of 
Islamic law and its ability to resist all calls for change, or is it in the genius 
of its flexible nature? 
This thesis attempts, in the first instance to ascertain whether Islamic 
legal theory (u§lil) 1 has made provisions for the accommodation of 
changing social exigencies. If such provisions have been made, are they 
adequately employed to achieve optimum benefit? 
In the second instance, the judicial process of discovering and formulat-
ing the Divine law and the elements that contribute towards it is 
subjected to scrutiny to ascertain w·hether it is proceeding according to 
the general provisions made for it in terms of the principles of the law, 
or, whether this crucial process has since been abandon.ed, corrupted, 
distorted or replaced. 
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I have used the terms "legal theory" and "legal tradition" to mean ufiil 
al-fiqh. U~ul al-fiqh is the formal science in which Muslim jurists have 
dealt with legal theories, principles of interpretations of legal texts, 
methods of reasoning and deduction of rules and other such matters. I have 
chosen four classical works of u.Jul al-fiqh on which to base my assessment 
of usul vis-a-vis changing social exigency. 
1. Al-Ghazzali, al-Must~[<ificllm al-U~ul (Beirut,1983) 2 Vols. 
2. Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashbah waAl-Na~Zi'ir (Beirut,1980). 
3. cAbd al-cAziz bin A9mad al-Bukhari, Kash[ al-Asrar (Beirut,1974) 
4 Vols. 
4. Wahbah al-Zuhayli, U~ul-al-Fiqh al-lslami (Damascus, 1978). 
The first work is a Shafi ci exposition; the second two are lj.anafi exposi-
tions, and the fourth is a general exposition not located in a particular legal 
school (madhhab). 2 
In the first chapter, I sketch the nature of the problem and tension which. 
exist between the dictates of law and the demands of social change. This , 
tension gives rise to two opposing views: the "immutable" and the adapt-
able". The protagonists of the "immutable" view assert that if the law is to 
retain its form as the expression of the divine command, if indeed it is to 
remain Islamic law, reforms cannot be justified on the ground of social 
necessity per se; they must find their juristic basis and support in principles 
wh~ch are Islamic in the sense that they are endorsed, expressly or implicit-
ly, by the divine will. The modernists, who are the espouses of the "adapt-
able" view, claim that the law can be, and indeed must be, adapted to 
support the social upheavals and progress of modern times. 
}!/' If 
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The second chapter locates and analyzes some of the provisions made 
in legal theory for the accommodation of changing social needs. For the 
purpose of this study I have chosen the doctrine of maslahah 3 (utility) 
and the concept of curf (prevailing norms) as examples of the provisions 
made by legal theory to cope with changing social exigencies. 
The primary focus of the third chapter is the "leeways" within a judicial 
system which strictly adheres to the concept of stare decisis (precedent). 
I attempt to illustrate the inherent leeways in the "fertility " of language 
in which the law is packaged and point to the "barrenness" of syllogistic 
argument in which the concept of precedent appears to be rooted. 
In the fourth chapter I deconstruct some false assumptions regarding the 
concept of cillah (ratio legis) and attempt to reconstruct a notion of cillah 
that affords the jurists ample leeways needed to accommodate social 
change. After illustrating the inherent leeways to be found in the legal 
propositions together with the inherent scope accompanying the notions 
of maslahah and curf, I proceed to evaluate the extent to which these 
leeways are employed in the actual judi~ial process of two of the world's 
most authoritative judicial institutions namely; al-Azhar (Cairo) and 
Darul · cUlum (Deoband). To do this, I analyze the fatwa (judicial 
decree) on organ transplantation from both these institutions. My 
analysis is not aimed at the outcome of the fatwahs, but rather at the 
processes involved in arriving at the particular verdicts. 
In my conclusion I point to the ample provisions made by legal theory 
to contend with any social exigency and to the tragic neglect of their 
employment in the application of the law to novel situations. It is, 
therefore, the inconsistency between the provisions of legal theory and 
the absence of their application in the actual judicial process that has 
contributed to the current tension between law and social change. 
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Notes for Introduction. 
1. K. Mas cud, Islamic Legal Philosophy (Islamabad, 1977), p.24. 
2. The term ''legal school" is the most acceptable translation of madhhab. Four 
3. 
Sunni legal schools have survived. The l}anafi school was founded by Abu 
I:Janifah (d.150/767). The Miliki school was founded by Milik bin Anas 
( d.179/795). Mu~ammad bin Idris al-Shifi ci ( d.204/820) founded the Shifi 
ci school. A~mad bin 1!anbal (d.241/855) was the founder of the fourth 
school. 
The technique of istis/0{1 (judgment on the grounds of welfare or utility) 
was the most liberal principle of legal interpretation in traditional currency, 
and one in which human value judgments were allowed their widest role. 
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Chapter I. 
1. Nature of the Problem. 
There has always existed a tension between legal theory and social 
change. As divine law1 is usually assumed to be unchanging, it faces the 
1: -. - \ 
powerful challenge of social change which de.mand~_a_qegr_e~~f 
flexibilijy_and adaQtabilitY. from it. 
In certain cases the impact of social change is so profound that it 
influences the interpretation of a legal document. This phenomenon is 
clearly reflected in the many United States Supreme Court rulings, 
where the judge's reading of the Constitution was a direct result of the 
impact of social change.2 
A classical example is the "Brown v. Board of Education" case of 1954 
in which the Supreme Court of USA upset the interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the equality of races, given nearly a half 
century earlier. 3 In Brown v. Board of Education, the black plaintiffs 
persuaded the Supreme Court to repudiate an earlier decision, Plessy v. 
Ferguson ( 1896), in which the Court had held that racial segregation did 
not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if 
the separate facilities were substantially equal.4 The plaintiffs' principal 
argument was that official classification based on race placed the stamp 
of government approval on the doctrine of black inferiority.5 The 
Supreme Court ruled in favour of the plaintiffs, which meant that 
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105,000 public school students of Washington, D.C., could no longer be 
separated on the basis of race.6 This crucial verdict was a direct result of 
the pressure exerted by public opinion and expectation, brought on by 
changing social norms. 
For the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static 
meaning it might have had In a world that is dead and 
gone.but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope 
with current problems and current needs.7 
Modern judges, therefore, know that each application of the Constitu-
tion entails a continuous clarification of its meaning and that it is not 
always practical to resolve a unique issue solely on the basis of histori-
cally distant and fixed conceptions. Indeed, there are some contem-
porary notions of justice, like the concept of freedom of religion, that 
cannot be confined to eighteenth-century normative perspectives.8 
Thus, the conventional judge is caught between the need to conform to 
society's reasonable expectations which are shaped by the unfolding 
process of changing social norms, while bound at the same time by the 
general tenor of the Constitution which governs that decision. It is, 
therefore, an important function of the courts to act as a communication 
channel both to the memories and the traditions of the past and to the 
felt needs of the present and the future. 
2.Islamic Law Immutable or Adaptable? 
What is clear is that all traditions, religious or non-religious, seek to 
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inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour, by establishing a sense 
of continuity with the past and an obligation to maintain such continuity, 
while at the same time reinterpreting those past values and norms to 
adapt to a novel and changing environment. 
A religious tradition quite unrelated to the world In which Its 
people seek to exist Is not a tradition: It Is an anachronism, 
at best a museum, at worst a mortuary. 9 
When dealing with change, it is essential to direct the process so as to 
remain loyal to the deepest levels of tradition and yet also to be open to 
the legitimate needs and exigencies of contemporary society. In this 
sense, it necessitates some responsible and reasoned understanding of 
what the authentic tradition is in order to realize legitimate goals for the 
immediate future. In a world of change, the survival of a tradition is 
inextricably linked to a strategy which constantly engages the demands 
made by such change. The question whether Islamic Law is adaptable or 
immutable, is characterized by the usual polemics that is a distinct 
feature of this dynamic tradition. 
2.1 The Orthodox View. 
Most of the classical10 traditional, orthodox11 Muslim jurists maintain 
that Islamic Law is immutable and hence, not adaptable to social 
change.12 
The protagonists of this view base their main argument on the concept 
I 
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that the law is of divine origin (wa};i). They contend that since the law is 
the "revealed injunction" of God, it is absolute and unchangeable. The 
concept of the divine nature and origin of Islamic Law underpins their 
view. It is argued that Islamic law is firmly rooted in Divine Revelation 
thi:ough the prophetic agency of Muhammad SAW. Since the law is 
divinely inspired, embedded in the Qura'n and the Sunnah13, it is 
believed to be sacred, final, inerrant, eternal; and hence immutable. i 4 
A more abstract argument posited by the protagonists of this view is that 
Islamic Law reflects or mirrors the Will (iradah) of God.15 This view 
contends that the law is thoroughly rooted in the Will of God. 
The law, which is the constitution of the Community, cannot 
be other than the Will of God, revealed through the Prophet. 
This is a Semitic form of the principle that 'The will of the 
sovereign is law', since God is the sole Head of the Com-
munity, and therefore sole Legislator. 16 
This argument is reflected in the theological debate between the Ash-
caris and ~he Muctazilis which deals with the issue of the free agency of 
man's acts. The Muctazilis espoused the notion of free will which at-
tributed to man the sole authority over his actions.17 On the other hand, 
the Ashcaris held that man is not the free agent of his acts, implying that 
all human acts are a direct consequence of the Divine Will. In order that 
man may be considered a separate entity from God, and thus have the 
capacity for a responsible relationship with Him, 18 his actions are simply 
"apparent occasions" of their consequences, raised to the level of free 
will. "Free will" in this context has no ultimate and independent reality 
of its own, but rather a limited psychological reality which is valid for 
the human conscience by virtue of "acquisition" (kasb) 19 A Muslim thus 
Epistemology of Islamic Law. Page9 
enters into a mithaq, an allegorical covenant by which he voluntarily 
submits to God's wm.20 
The orthodox view is firmly rooted in the concept of predestination and 
therefore subscribes to the notion that nothing can be qualified as good 
or bad, but in relation to God's Will.21 Furthermore, His Will can only 
be ascertained through revelation and not through human reason. 
2.2 Epistemology of Islamic Law. 
The question of epistemology embraces two crucial issues. The method 
of knowing the law and the precise role of human reason in this exer-
cise.22 It is my contention that the extensive legal debate between the 
modernists and the orthodoxy on the important issue of Islamic law and 
social change is a direct result of their divergent views of the epistemol-
ogy of Islamic law. 
The dominant view clearly posits that Islamic law is not the product of 
human intellectual endeavour and is therefore neither shaped nor de-
pendent on the social milieu.23 As Coulson describes it: 
Floatlng above Muslim society as a disembodied soul, freed 
from the currents and vicissitudes of time, it [Islamic Law] 
represented the eternally valid ideal towards which society 
must aspire. 24 
Islamic Law, as the product of divine inspiration and therefore, im-
mutable, was further entrenched by the conviction of the imperfection 
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of human reason and its inability to apprehend by its sole powers, the 
real nature of the good, or indeed of any reality whatsoever. The Ashcari 
view is that reason has no part whatsoever in the determination of what 
is good or evil without (the assistance of] divine revelation.25 Since this 
concept of the epistemology of law denies the primary role of human 
reason in the process of law making, orientalists such as Schacht26 and 
Hourani27 feel that certain irrational elements have survived in Islamic 
law. Bousquet went as far as to claim that Islamic Law is often based 
upon "rationally absurd hypotheses".28 
The classical debate of reason vs revelation represents the zenith of a 
process whereby the specific terms of the law came to be conceived as 
the irrevocable and immutable Will of God.29 In contrast with legal 
systems based upon human reason and utility, a system of divine law such 
as the Jslamic_Q.._n_e,.p,o~~ses two major distinctive charact~~is!ics. Fi~st-
----~ -·- - . - - " -- . 
ly, it is a ~id ~d immutabJe _sy_sJell}, embodying norms of an absolute 
. -· .. __. 
and eternal validity which are beyond the jurisdiction of any legislative 
authority. Secondly, for the mariy different_p-e9p_l_~~-who constitute_ th~ 
,.. ... , ___ .,..._....._..-.-.... --~ 
cummah (community) of Islam, the divinely ordained Shari cah repre-
sents the standard of uniformity as against the variety of legal systems 
which would be the inevitable result if law were to be the product of 
human reason shaped by, and in response to circumstances and the 
'--- -·. 
particular needs of given communities.30 It is clear that such an epis-
temology must in theory promote rigidity and uniformity. However, 
when scrutinizing the Islamic legal tradition, diversity rather than 
uniformity is its conspicuous hallmark. Any substantial work on Islamic 
law is virtually saturated with pc;i~~i~1 Hence, diversity rather than 
'- --~-. 
uniformity is the distinct characteristic of Islamic law. The notion of a 
uniform Shari cah is seriously qualified by wide variations of opinion 
between different schools and individual jurists.32 
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If we accept the notion that human reason plays an insignificant role in 
the determination of the law, then why is it that diversity which is the 
fruits of human reason, is so pervasive? Why this apparent discrepancy 
between ideal and reality, or theory an~"1t is in the answers to 
such crucial questions that I feel the solution to the problem of the 
application of the law lie. The immutability view is primarily based upon 
the ideal theoretical conception of divine law without much reference 
to the world of reality. Hence, any deep analysis of the application of 
such an idealistic concept will reveal the cleavage between theory and 
application (praxis). The assertion of uniformity is therefore severely 
undermined by the diversity of disputed law. 
2.3 Islamic Law and its Definition. 
Another argument forwarded in favour of the concept of immutability 
of Islamic law is based upon the definition of the law. The law is defined 
as a code of morals and ethics, firmly entrenching the concept of im-
mutability as ethics and morals are not adaptable. Since law and morality 
have a great deal in common, they are often confused.33 This led many 
scholars such as Gibb to define Islamic Law as a system of ethics.34 He 
bases his main argument on the fact that the Islamic classification .of 
categories of action are moral, and not juridical. The five categories 
listed are: obligatory, recommended, indifferent (permissible), 
reprehensible and forbidden. These categories are moral and ethical 
rather than juridical.35 This view is further entrenched by the Islamic 
term used for a penalty; ~ududAllah (the limits set by God) which clearly 
emphasizes the fact that an offence has been committed against God and 
it is His sole prerogative to impose punishment.36 . 
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Now, while it is correct to assert that Islamic law cannot be separated 
from morals, it also embraces a "devotional" (ibadah) dimension which 
is neither devoid of morals nor entirely based upon it.37 Even in the west, 
when certain jurists have militated for the separation of law from morals, 
there was an immediate, strong reaction against any such moves. What 
clearly emerges from the classical Hart- Fuller debate is the fact that the 
organic relationship between law and morals is of such a nature that any 
attempt at their separation (Hart) must evoke a counter attempt 
(Fuller).Hence, the utilitarian distinction between "what the law is and 
what it ought to be"38 cannot thus be applicable to Islamic law. 
Although there is a distinction between a legally enforceable rule and 
the morally desireable rule, it is not a distinction between a rule which 
is observed in practice as opposed to one which is not. 39 Real values and 
norms around which a society structures its life, are not always and 
merely those which are enforceable in the courts. Had the application 
of the law been dependent upon the coercive force of the courts, it would 
have waned in places where the courts have no jurisdiction. There are 
undoubtedly more powerful and charismatic forces operative in society 
that secure the observance of standards of behaviour than legal coer-
cion.40 In traditional Islamic society, the consciousness, recognition and 
acceptance of the standards of religious values and morality were in-
stilled into the masses through a well orchestrated network of influen-
ces, inter alia: the great influence wielded by charismatic men of religion 
in public and private office, the religious scholars and teachers in the 
educational establishments, the imams in the many mosques and 
through the institution of the Friday sermon (khufbah), and finally 
through the rulings of the muftis (jurisconsults ). I am therefore in 
agreement with those scholars that maintain that Islamic law is both a 
·----code of law and a code of morals.It embraces a comprehensive scheme 
~ --
Adaptability View. Page 13 
of human behaviour which derives from the Will of God, which incor-
porates a legal as well as a moral dimension.41 Scholars have used the 
definition oflslamic law as a code of morals to further substantiate their 
view that Islamic law is immutable.42 
The main arguments of the protagonists of the immutability of Islamic 
law can be summed up as follows: 43 
1.) Since Islamic law is rooted in a divine source, rulings are eternal, 
absolute, final, and unalterable. 
2.) Islamic law is not a product of human endeavor, hence it is beyond 
human tampering done in the name of change. 
3.) Islamic law is a code of ethics or morals which must remain consistent 
and hence immutable. 
These arguments are then the basis for the view that Islamic law is 
immutable and hence not adaptable to social change.44 
3. Adaptability View. 
It is crucial to note that the term "adaptability" has been used by modern 
scholars in two senses. For the purpose of clarity and accuracy, the two 
uses of the term must be distinguished. One use of the term means "the 
possibility of expanding the already existing body of the law" to accom-
modate current exigencies. In the second sense, it means "the openness 
of this body of law to change according to the social needs and condi-
tions". The former sense of the term is hardly in question here. With the 
exception of a few literalists, "adaptability " in the first sense has always 
been allowed by all jurists. In actual fact, qiyas (analogy}45 arose from 
this meaning of adaptability.46 
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The second sense does not merely connote the "extension"47 of the 
existing law, but implies that the development of the law takes place. 
around the broad principles laid out by the Qur'an and the Sunnah 
(primary sources). Law is thus continuously formulated in the light of 
the primary sources to cope with new contingencies and exigencies. 
3.1 Legal Modernism. 
According to the classical tradition as we have already seen, law is 
imposed from above and postulates the eternally valid standards to 
which the structure of state and society must conform. In the modernist 
approach, law is shaped by the needs of society; its function in society 
entails the need to solve social problems.48 Yet, the modern Muslim 
scholars concede that the needs and aspirations of society cannot be the 
exclusive determinant of the law; they can legitimately operate only 
within the bounds of the norms and principles irrevocably established 
by the divine command. And it is precisely the determination of these 
limits which is the bone of contention.49 The clash, therefore, between 
the allegedly rigid dictates of the traditional law and the demands of 
modern society poses for both liberal and orthodox scholars, the fun-
damental problem of u{iil (principle). If the law is to retain its form as 
the expression of the divine command, if indeed it is to remain Islamic 
law, reforms cannot be justified on the ground of social necessity per se; 
they must find their juristic basis and ·support in principles which are 
Islamic in the sense that they are endorsed, explicitly or implicitly, by 
the Divine Will.50 It therefore becomes the task of the modern scholar 
to first establish the nature of the law in terms of rigidity, and secondly 
' 
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to identify those legal as well as extra-legal principles that could be 
appropriated in order to usher in the desired changes. 
The Reformers acknowledged that many of the existing laws, in their 
traditional form were e:_~ but because they were based on 
religious51 (divine) principles, they could not be discarded easily. On the 
other hand, contemporary social needs called for a type of radical 
adaptation which meant the renunciation of established legal principles. 
In order to justify the departure from established norms, the idea of the 
"flexibility" of the sources was entertained. In its extreme form, legal 
modernism rests its case upon the notion that the Will of God was never 
expressed in terms so rigid or "immutable" as the classical doctrine 
maintained, but that it enunciates broad general principles which admit 
of differing interpretations and varying applications according to the 
circumstances and dire needs of the time. Legal modernism, therefore, 
is a movement towards an historical exegesis of divine revelation.52 
3.2 Divine Origin of Islamic Law and Adaptability. 
In response to the argument of Islamic law being rooted in divine 
sources, the protagonists of the adaptability-view maintain that the 
amount of strictly legal material existing in the revealed sources is very 
limited in comparison to what developed out of it. Therefore Leon 
Ostrorog53 and S.G. Fritzgerald54 feel that the whole body of Islamic law 
is not "revealed" but rather developed as a result of human endeavour. 
They concede that systems of law tend to be perfect and portrayed to be 
permanent, hence a sense of immutability gathers around the concept 
of law. But they also maintain that changing social needs challenge such 
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an attitude and law in practice almost always succumbs to social needs. 
Various systems devise different methods to meet such challenges. For 
instance, Roman Law resolved this problem by distinguishing between 
jus civile which was strict and jus honorarium which was flexible55 In 
Common Law flexibility was achieved through Equity. 
Modern scholarship has increasingly suggested that Islamic law did 
evolve methods to adapt legal theory to changes. The immutability 
school held to the concept that the work of God in history is embodied 
in fixed institutional forms, which were as a consequence changeless and 
permanent. If they were in truth divine, they should be, like God, 
eternal, everlasting and beyond relativity, time and change. The adap-
tability school, on the other hand, maintains that the sacredness oflslam 
is not found in the changelessness of her forms, but in her fidelity 
through changing forms to her mission in the _world and so to the final 
purpose of God. Futhermore, it is contemporary life that must provide 
the experiential content and the conceptual forms that legitimate the 
world view lest the men and women who seek to live in their terms find 
them empty, meaningless, irrelevant and impotent.56 Therefore, a rift 
certainly developed between the terms of the classical law and the varied 
and changing demands of Muslim society; and, where the Shan cah was 
unable to make the necessary accommodation, local customary law 
continued to prevail in practice.57 
3.3 The Role of Reason in Determining the Law. 
Western scholarship has demonstrated that Shan cah law originated as 
the implementation of the precepts of divine revelation within the 
The Role of Reason In Determining the Law. Page 17 
framework of the current social milieu, and thus provides the basis of 
historical fact to support the philosophy underlying legal modernism. 
Coulson maintains that once the classical theory is seen in its historical 
perspective, as simply a stage in the evolution of the Sharie ah, modernist 
activities no longer appear as a total departure from the one and only 
legitimate position, but preserve the continuity of Islamic legal tradition 
by continuing the attitude of the earliest jurists, and reviving a corpus 
whose growth had been artificially arrested. 
Modernist activities, therefore, can find their most solid foundation in 
a correct appreciation of the historical growth of Shari cah law. As this 
modernist movement gathers momentum and a new era in Muslim 
jurisprudence is ushered in, legal history assumes a role of vital and. 
previously unparalleled significance. The Modern Muslim jurist of today 
cannot afford to be a bad historian58 
On the basis of the above argument, the reformers concluded that 
rigidity of Islamic law was not so much a result of the nature of law, as 
it is the direct result of the actions of the earlier jurists. There arose an 
acute awareness among the jurists to protect the idealism of their con-
cept of ultimate sovereignty from the corruptions to which it would 
inevitably be exposed during the process of interpretation and applica-
tion.59 In order to insulate the law against abuse and arbitrary interpreta-
tion, post-medieval jurists erected a solid wall around the works of the 
classical jurists. It would seem that the latter jurists indirectly torpedoed 
any attempt at "new" ijtihad60 by placing severe restrictions upon its 
exercise. This was accomplished by systematically lengthening the list of 
qualifications needed to entitle one to ijtihad. Since the required 
I 
qualifications could almost never be found in one single scholar, the 
concept that the "doors of ijtihad are closed", gained currency. 
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4. The Point of Convergence. 
Despite the differing views espoused by the two opposing groups, they 
do not dispute the fact that social changes have occurred in Islamic 
history and that legal changes did take place. But whereas the adap-
tability view relates these mutations to the flexible nature of Islamic law, 
the immutability view does not. 
In classical jurisprudence we find two types of laws. Those that are 
directly based upon the revealed texts (man{ii~ calayhi) like the duty to 
perform the five daily prayers and the prohibition of fornication and 
adultery'. The other type is based upon individual interpretation (muj-
tahid fihi), for example, the law that governs the precise time of the late 
afternoon prayer (~r).61 The immutability of the former is not in 
dispute. :Even those who subscribe to the adaptability view regard those 
laws that are based upon direct and explicit divine injunctions as per-
manent and beyond change, hence, on this point there is general agree-
ment. 62 It is with regard to the mujtahidfihi laws that the protagonists of 
the adaptability view contend that change is both permissible and im-
minent. 
The immutability view, as we have seen, does not in theory recognize 
that Islamic law is subject to change because it subscribes to the notion 
that precedent is binding. 
Therefore the debate is then not about the historicity of legal changes, 
but about the theory of Islamic law regarding these changes.63 Both 
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positions, however, admit the view of the opposite group on some points. 
For instance, the immutability view submits to its opponent in maintain-
ing that Islamic law was adaptable in its formative period.64 The adap-
tability view on -the other hand admits that after the "closing of the doors 
of ijtihad", Islamic law showed less inclination to adaptability because 
the concept of taqlid gained currency.65 
It would thus seem that the reformer's view of legal theory, which posits 
the notion that fixed authoritative legal principles are capable of growth, 
has a great deal in common with the American concept of Con-
stitutionalism. Although the American Constitution is "fixed", its in-
herent leeways often afford the judge the room needed to apply the law 
with optimum benefit. The conscientious judge realizes that his private 
views are subordinate to a socially acceptable standard that requires 
impartiality. The judge's duty is not to inject peculiar meaning or per-
sonal bias, but rather to extract authentic meaning from the text which 
is the valid source of the law. Hence, a judge, having a hermeneutical 
perspective, is never completely free of the general tenor of the text, 
since it (text) suggests the parameters and factors that he must take into 
account. This hermeneutical exercise requires both will and initiative, 
but it is incorrect to always equate them with improper subjectivism. His 
judgment is expected to be verifiable as a valid norm by another valid 
norm contained within the Constitution. Although he is often compelled 
to look outside the Constitution, he is looking outside to determine the 
acceptable meaning of the language within. His challenging .task is to 
integrate the intended meaning of the Constitution with its perceived 
applicable and socially acceptable meaning. 
A process is at work as judges attuned to the public's social conscience, 
try to preserve the Constitution while new developments of law are 
generated. It is by means of this process that the impartial judge seeks 
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the most authentic meaning of the Constitution; but his prejudices, often 
reflecting truth, are the energies that constitute his mind. Thus, the 
eventual ruling, if certain institutional technical requirements are met, 
is neither solely objective nor subjective, but authoritative. Modern 
Islamic scholars, like judges, know that each application of the Divine 
Law or Constitution entails a continuous clarification of its meaning and 
that it is not always practical to resolve a unique issue solely on the basis 
of historically distant conceptions. What is called for is a decision that 
is relevant to contemporary experience, which is at the same time bound 
to the general tenor of the Constitution. As Justice Evans Hughes once 
remarked: "We are under the Constitution, but the constitution is what 
the judges say it is."66 
The reformers recognize the importance of changing social needs on the 
one hand, and realize on the other hand, that the needs and aspirations 
of society cannot be, in Islam, the exclusive determinant of the law; they 
can legitimately operate only within the bounds of the norms and prin-
ciples irrevocably established by the divine command. It is the setting of 
limits on social demands that are acceptable to the dictates of the divine 
command, that characterizes the debate between the traditionalists and 
liberals, each espousing different criteria of acceptability. 
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER I. 
1. Islamic law refers to those rules and regulations (a!tkam) that are. 
based upon divine authority, whether directly or indirectly. The sour-
ces (majadir) of this law are categorized into two. The first source of 
the law is divine revelation (wa!ti) and the sunnah of Prophet 
Muhammed SAW. This original source of the law is known as the qat 
ciyat ( certain, definite). Those laws which are derived through the use 
of the man's rational senses, taqliyat) forms the second source of the 
law. The second source is directly dependent upon the existence of the 
first and interacts with it to form the basis for the extension of the 
first. The second could not exist without the first. This source is known 
as the ;a1111iyat (cognitive or concei:ved). A/-ijm~(consensus), ijtihad 
(personal discretion), qiyas (analogy) and majla[wh (utility) are all 
based upon the second source. (c Abd al-Ra\J.man ~abuni, Al-Madkal 
ff dirasah al~Fiqlt al-Islam, (Damascus, 1978), Vol.I, p.23. 
2. The genius of the Constitution is its adaptive quality which enables 
judges to affirm a novel conception of law, that appears to change the 
text's original meaning and at the same time, maintaining its binding 
quality which restricts judges from steering away from the general 
tenor of the Constitution. Although the Constitution is "fixed", it still 
possesses inherent leeways which affords the instant judge enough 
room to accommodate certain changes.In the case of the Qur'an, 
which is the Muslim jurists's "constitution", a similar situation is ex-
perienced where, despite the appearance of "fixed" injunctions, in-
herent leeways results in a proliferation of diverse interpretations. 
Owing to this similarity I have on occasions used the American Legal 
System as a source of analogy.For further study of how judges inter-
pret this "fixed" Constitution to accommodate social change, see: J .A. 
Garraty, Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution (New York, 
1964). 
3. W. Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society (London, 1972), p.27. 
4. Raymond Wolters, The Burden of Brown (Knoxville, 1984), p.4. 
5. Ibid., p.9 .. 
6. Ibid., p.4. 
7. Brennan, The Constitution of The United of States p.7 
8. The original concept of freedom of religion is today interpreted as 
meaning, freedom from religion. 
9. Gilkey, Catholicism Confronts Modernity, A Protestant View (New 
York, 1975), p. 111. 
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10. The word "orthodox" seem to have gained a multiplicity of different 
connotations. It is therefore essential that I specify precisely what I 
mean by this term. The definition of this word "adhering to the ac-
cepted or traditional and established faith" (Great Illustrated Diction-
ary [London, 1984)) is, as one can see fairly broad. My use of the word 
is intended to connote the established, conservative, puritanical, 
"received view" of the Su11111 Ash cari school. 
11. By dassical I mean, time honoured, well-established, celebrated, ac-
claimed, illumed scholars. Medieval (between 4/lOth and 10/16th cen-
tury) scholars such as al-Ghazzali is an example par excellence of what 
I mean by "classical" scholars. 
12. Sa cid Rama<Jan Bu!i, pawabiJ a/-Ma~la[iah (Beirut, 1977), p.285. 
Khalid Mas cud, Islamic Legal Philosophy, p. 1. 
{')
For a comprehensive and very detailed study of the exact meaning of 
the term Su1111ah, refer to Fazlur Ra~man, Islamic Methodology in 
History (Islamabad, 1984), p.1-82. For our immediate purpose the term 
Sunnah will refer to the sayings, tradition and the customs of the 
Prophet. I also used the term ljadzth interchangeably with Sunnah. 
14. Sa cid Ramadan Buti, Dawabit a/-Mas/ahah, p.285 
. . . . . . . . 
Sa cid Rama~an, Islamic Law, Its Scope and Equity 1970, pp.25-26. 
M. Khadduri, "From Religion to National Law" J .J. Thompson (ed.). 
Modernization of the Arab World. (Princeton: Nostrand, 1966), p.38. 
H.Lammens, Islam, Beliefs and Institutions (London, 1929), p.82. 
N.J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh, 1964), p.12. 
H.A.R.Gibb, Islamic Society and the West (Toronto, 1957), p.114. 
J.N.D. Anderson, Islamic Law in the Modem World (New York, 1959), 
p.17. . 
15. Sa cid Rama<Jan, Islamic Law, Its Scope and Equity 1970, p.15. 
16. H.A.R. Gibb, Mohammedanism, p.99. · 
Sa cid Rama~an, Islamic Law, Its Scope and Equity 1970, p.12. 
17. For a thorough detailed discussion on the question of predestination 
and freewill, refer to Harry Wolfson, The Philosophy of Ka/am (Lon-
don, 1976), pp.601- 717. 
18. M.H. Kerr, Islamic Reform (California, 1966), p. 20. 
19. Al-Mawardi, al-A[1kam a/-Sul_(iiniyya, Leon Ostrorog, (transl.), (Paris, 
1906), p. 68- 71. 
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20. "Am I not thy Lord? Yes they replied." (7:172)The whole concept of 
mithaq is based upon the implications of this verse. c Abd al- c Aziz bin 
Apmad al-Bukhari, Kashf al-Asrar (Beirut, 1974), Vol. 4, p.238. 
Louis Gardet, La Cite musulmane (Paris, 1954), p. 183. 
21. Sa cid Rama<fan BiiJi, pawabif al-Ma~la!Jah, pp.12-14 
.c Abd al- c Aziz bin Agmad al-Bukhari, Kashf al-Asrar, Vol. 4, p.230. 
H.A.R. Gibb, Studies on the Civilization of Islam (Boston, 1968), 
pp.204-206. 
22. K. Mas cud, Islamic Legal Philosophy, p. 8. 
23. c Abd al- c Aziz bin Ahmad al-Bukhari, Kash/ al-Asrar, Vol. 4, p.230 
p.230. Also see Mullah Jewan, Nur al-Anwar (Khanpur, 1958), p.281. 
This view is further entrenched by the Qur'anic verse: "It is not fitting 
for a believer, man or women, when a matter has been decided by God 
and his Apostle, to have any option about their decision." (33:35) 
24. N.J.Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, p.2. 
25. cAbd al- cAziz bin A~mad al-Bukhari, Kash/ al-Asrar, Vol.4, p.230. 
Mullah Jewan, Nur al-Anwar, p.281. 
H.A.R. Gibb, Mohammedanism, p.90. 
26. J .Schacht, Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford, 1966), p.202-203. 
27. G.F.Hourani, Islamic Rationalism (Oxford, Clarendon, 1971), p.8-14. 
28. G.H. Bousquet, Precis de droit m11s11lman (Algiers, 1947), p.44. 
Since the latter argument impinges upon another classical debate 
namely, reason vs revelation, which is clearly beyond the immediate 
scope of this study, I merely wish to record the view without engaging 
the argument. 
29. c Abd al- c Aziz bin A~mad al-Bukhari, Kash/ al-Asrar, Vol. 4, pp.230-
231. 
Mullah Jewan, Nur al-Anwar, p.281. 
N.J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, p.4. 
30. N.J.Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, p.5. 
31. A typical example of a work on Islamic law is Ibn al-Humam's Fat!i 
al-QadTr 10 volumes (Cairo, 1970). 
32. N.J.Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, p.5. 
33. K. Mas cud, Islamic Legal Philosoplly, p.9. 
34. H.A.R. Gibb, Islamic Society and the West (Toronto, 1957), p.118. 
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35. Ibid., p.118. 
36. J .Schacht, Introduction to Islamic Law, p.207. 
37. The law that prescribes the slaughtering of an animal (qurbani) during 
tenth, eleventh or twelfth day of Dhil IJajj (eleventh month of the 
Muslim calendar) could hardly be said to be based entirely upon moral 
considerations. 
38. For a comprehensive view of this debate on positivism and the separa-
tion of law and morals, see 
H.L.A. Hart, "Positivism and The Separation of Law and Morals" in 
Harvard Law Review Vol. 71, Feb. 1958, p.593-629. Also see L.L.Fuller, 
"Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart" ibid, 
p.630-672. 
This famous and classical Hart Fuller debate which rocked the legal 
community, continues today, see Hugh Corder (ed) Law and Social 
Practice in South Africa (Cape Town, 1988), p.123-180. 
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43. Most of the orthodox jurists subscribe to the immutable view. see: Sa 
cid Rama<)an BuF,Pawab(t al-Ma1la!1ah, p.285. Many orientalists such 
as Gibb and Schacht also form part of this group. 
44. M.K. Mas cud Islamic Legal Philosophy, p.1. 
45. In order to extend the law, textual evidence (na~~) was th·e necessary 
basis. Hence, the method of qiyas was developed in order to extend 
the law. It rested upon the assumption that in a given law revealed in 
the Qura'n or ljadith, a particular attribute of the subject ruled upon 
is the cillah (ratio legis) or governing consideration, and by estab-
lishing what this cillah is, the law could be systematically extended to 
other comparable situations. 
46. K. Mas cud Islamic Legal Philosophy, p.21 
.47. The process of extending the law implies that the premises from which 
the law is to be extended already exists and is known. 
48. N.J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, p.5. 
Notes for Chapter I Page 25 
49. Ibid., p.6. 
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51. M.H. Kerr, Islamic Reform, p. 3. 
52. N .J .Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, p. 7. 
53. Leon Ostrorog, The Angora Reform (London, 1927), p.19. 
54. S.G.Fritzgerald, "Nature and Sources of Shari cah", in Law in the 
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55. M.K. Mas cud, Islamic Legal Philosophy, p.18. 
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57. N.J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, p.5. 
58. Ibid., pp.5-7. 
59. For further study of the orthodox jurists' activities, see M.H. Kerr, 
Islamic Reform, pp. 55-102. 
60. The term ijtihad literally means an extreme struggle. In Islamic legal 
theory the term is used to describe the scholar's employment of intel-
lectual effort or personal discretion in arriving at the most authentic 
interpretation on matters pertaining to religion. For a detailed discus-
sion on the meaning of ijtihad see: 
Mu~ammad Taqi Amini, Fundamentals of ijtihad (Bombay, 1986), 
pp.1-8. 
61. fatbiq Shar;cah al-Islam (Riyadh, 1984), p.114. 
62. Sa Cid Ramadan Buti, Dawabit a/-Maslahah, p.279, p.283. 
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Ziya Gokalp (d.1343 A.H.) attempted to give the concept of cur/ a 
different dimension. He distinguishes the social elements of the law 
from the traditional (devotional) elements. 
"The sources of the Shar;cah are two: traditional Shari cah and social 
Shari cah. But social Shari cah is in a continuous process of becoming, 
like all social phenomena. As a result, that part of fiqh is not only 
susceptible to evolution in accordance with social evolution, it has to· 
change. The fundamentals of fiqh relating to nau are constant and 
immutable, whereas the social application of these fundamentals 
based on curf and ijma c have to adapt themselves in accordance with 
the necessities of life." Ziya Gokalp, Turkish Nationalism (London: 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1959), p.196. He lays great stress on the 
importance of curf, because it constitutes the living law of the com-
munity. According to him, a law that is dead or is an anachronism 
cannot be expected to regulate the life of a community. 
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Chapter II. 
A Islam began to expand its geographical boundaries, it came into 
direct contact with a multiplicity of differing cultures and milieus. In 
order to effectively govern these conquered nations, it meant taking 
cognizance of the peculiarities and needs of those cultures. To actualize 
Islamic ideals in these differing real life situations, meant inter alia, the 
employment of skills of finding the correct synthesis of Islamic ideals 
and contemporary experience reflected in social needs. 
1. 1hmslation of Ideal into Reality. 
For the Muslim, Islam represented the decisive intervention of the 
supernatural order into the natural order, so as to guide, prepare, and 
ultimately translate every ideal in the supernatural order into the natural 
order of lived experience. This intervention of supernatural into nature 
and history is the sole basis for the power, authority, law, and mission of 
religion here on earth.1 This dichotomy between the sacred and the . 
profane also pervades the legal sphere and jurists found themselves 
increasingly under pressure to translate these ideals into livable reality. 
Thus, it became their duty to reconcile these two sets of contrasting 
elements. The traditional way was to insist on implementing the ideal 
exactly as it was originally formulated. This was so even though the ideal 
was formulated in response to a different set of soci~l needs and be-
havior. 
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The Qur'an, which is the embodiment of the ideal, was revealed in 
response to certain real life situations. Hence the asbab al-nuzul ( oc-
casions of revelation) form an integral part of the understanding of the 
revealed ideal. Any extrapolation of laws, values and norms from the 
revealed ideal, had to take into account the real life situation of the 
community which sought to implement those laws and values. Any 
radical difference in the real life situations of the different communities, 
as was experienced when the Muslims began to conquer new lands, was 
bound to influence the hermeneutical exercise. An example of this was 
the development of different legal views and opinions which emerged 
from the different geographical positions. On many issues the jurists of 
Medina held views that were different to those of the jurists of Iraq and 
Syria on the same issues.2 
Gradually, due to the rapid change in social conditions, the disparity 
between the ideal and reality began to increase, and the juristic exercise 
of "translating" the ideal into practical reality was failing. People began 
to seek their inspiration elsewhere. 3 This state of affairs precipitated the 
move towards finding means and ways of adapting and distilling from 
contemporary life and experience whatever spiritual essence these may 
possess. In other words the reversal of the above procedure which 
insisted on the implementation of the ideal, irrespective of its real life 
setting, was considered. This meant, translating or more correctly, dis-
tilling certain contemporary realities into the ideal. Distillation involves 
consideration and careful reflection of the essential and crucial ex-
perience of all contemporary and prevailing incarnations and the ex-
trication and drawing from them the essence which is then sanctioned 
and legitimized. Distillation comprises of a dual process; the process of 
extrication and the process of legitimation. This legitimation is done 
through the establishment of compatibility and integration with the 
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maq'i4id (intent) of the din (religion). Reinterpreting and reappropriat-
ing the contemporary lived experience so as to reflect congeniality and 
compatibility with the maq'r4id is a process that is not only vital for the 
survival of a tradition but also "enriches the content of the tradition and 
develops its creative power in human existence. "4 
1. 1 Qiyas as a Legal Principle for Extending the Law. 
As the Islamic legal system developed and was exposed to varying 
conditions and different environments, the need to apply the law to 
novel situations began to increase at a rate where it became necessary 
to devise a systematic methodology for drawing conclusions from the 
primary sources (Qur'an and Sunnah). 
The chief tool employed in this methodology was the system of qiyas. 5 
Thus, it became necessary, when confronted by a new problem, to draw 
parallels between the instant problem and its equivalent in the sources 
on the basis ·of their similarity. The similarity was determined by a 
common denominator, the cillah (ratio legis). Once it was established 
that both cases, the instant and the original, share the same cillah, the 
original ruling was applied to the instant case, thus ensuring that the 
judgment decreed by God was extended to all cases of the same genus. 
Legal theory developed a coherent body of principles and rules designed 
to govern the procedure of qiyas, especially, as we will shortly see, the 
process of identifying and establishing the cillah.6 This was crucial be-
cause failure to strictly regulate the process of extrapolating the cillah 
would inevitably lead to arbitrary rulings based upon personal opinions. 
To the extent that the process of extrapolating the cillah could be brought 
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under control, to that extent would the application of the law to novel 
situations be safeguarded against arbitrary judgment. The only conceiv-
able means of extending the divine origins of the law to new rulings, was 
the establishment of a valid connection between the two. That connec-
tion was the cillah, the ratio for which God decreed a particular command 
or judgment. 
The concept of qiyas received official status as an independent legal 
principle because it was in conformity with the legal norm of distilling 
from the "top" i. e. textual evidence being the exclusive basis and an 
integral component of the process of qiyas. At most, qiyas was able to 
serve as an extension of the law from the realm of the known sacred to 
the realm of the unknown real on the basis of a common cillah that exists 
between the two. However, in reaction to criticism of arbitrariness, the 
doctrine of qiyas was soon placed in the custody and protection of strict 
formality. 7 
What clearly emerges from a study of the history of Islamic legal theory 
is that on the one hand, there existed the dire need to adapt the Islamic 
legacy to the demand of changing social exigencies, while on the other 
hand, there was a fear that such adaptation may destroy the sanctity of 
the Law. The concept of ra'y (personal opinion) gained considerable 
currency during the formative period of Islamic legal theory, but the 
diversity of laws that resulted from the exercise of ra'y which charac-
terized the rulings of the qadis and muftis in various cities,8 was soon 
brought under the aegis of the stricter, more systematic, and less ar-
bitrary method of qiyas. Qiyas was not considered as a method of "adapt-
ing" the law to meet the need but essentially as a method of "extending" 
the law to different circumstances. 
In order to extend the law, textual evidence (n~~) was the necessary 
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basis. Hence, the method of qiyas was developed in order to extend the 
law. It rested upon the assumption that in a given law revealed in the 
Qur'an or If adith, a particular attribute of the subject ruled upon is the 
cillah (ratio legis) or governing consideration, and by establishing what 
this cillah is, the law could be systematically extended to other com-
parable situations.9 
In the case of adapting the law to accommodate social needs, direct 
textual evidence was not a prerequisite. What was needed was to estab-
lish the clear intent and spirit (maqa~id) of the law so as to apply it to 
novel situations.10 
2. Adapting the Law : Maslahah. 
• • 
In the search for answers to the pressing social needs and different 
demands made by communities in different contexts, principles and 
legal guidelines were developed by the early jurists. These legal prin-
ciples were aimed at directing the judicial process so as to remain loyal 
to the deepest levels of tradition, while at the same time seeking to 
· accommodate social needs. One such principle which developed out of 
the dire need to accommodate current exigencies, was the principle of 
maslahah.11 
. . 
Etymologically the word m~la~ah is the infinitive noun of the root s-1-h. 
The verb fala~a is used to describe something that becomes good, just, 
virtuous, honest, or uncorrupted. It would seem that m~laJ:tah became 
a principle of legal reasoning12 because it is argued that good is lawful 
and what is lawful must be good. This type of reasoning gained currency 
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during the formative period of fiqh. 13 This concept of ma~la~ah began 
to be developed by the classical jurists to an extent that the law (a}J,kam) 
was conceived by the majority of jurists to be founded upon m~lalJah.14 
· It would appear that although many jurists use the term ma~la}J,ah and 
m~lal;zah al-mursalah interchangeably, there is however a difference 
between the two. In terms oflegal theory(uful al-fiqh), the termm~lal;zah 
refers to general utility, benefit, and welfare, which are directly endorsed 
by the original sources; Qur'an and Sunnah. 15 The term maslahah al-
. . 
mursalah refers to that benefit which is neither directly sanctioned nor. 
prohibited by the a~l (original sources).16 An example of m~la[iah 
al-mursalah is the compilation of the Qur'an into one complete text. The 
benefit of this compilation is neither .sanctioned nor prohibited by the 
117 as. 
In its formative period, a concept emerges in response to a need and is 
qualified by a bare minimum of restrictive controls. Gradually, as the 
concept blossoms into a fully fledged principle and gains prominence and 
acceptability in a wider sense, an accompanying fear of corruption enters 
and we find more and more restrictive qualification being placed upon 
the concept to control its application. This development is integral to any 
doctrine in the process of formulation. This "tightening up" phenomenon 
is clearly traceable in the case of the doctrine of ijtihad. The right to 
exercise ijtihad was conferred upon Mu cad bin Jabal by the Prophet 
without any clear restrictions.18 Since then, the doctrine of ijtihad has 
undergone a major reassessment and "tightening up", culminating in a 
highly restricted field of activity, governed by a rigid code of strictures.19 
In the case of m~lal;iah the process of "tightening up" was born out of the 
need, inter alia, to preclude any arbitrary and unrestricted use of lenien-
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cy. In the absence of such restrictive qualification, the concept would 
most certainly be exposed to abuse which runs counter to the purpose for 
which it was developed. 20 
2. 1 Application of Maslahah. 
• • 
According to Imam al-~aramayn al-Juwayni (438/1047) three different 
positions emerged with regard to the application of the doctrine of 
m~labah.21 
Some Shafi cis and mutakallim'iin ( dialectical theologians) only accepted 
the concept of maJlabah if it was rooted in a specific textual basis (n~§). 
If maflal:zah could not be corroborated by, or contradicts textual 
evidence, it was considered invalid. This is then the one extreme position 
that restricted the application of ma§labah.22 It rejects the idea of giving 
preference to ma§labah in direct opposition to na.y§ because such an 
exercise will tantamount to legislating (tashn..c), a prerogative which God 
alone possesses.23 Also among this group are the ~anbalis.24 
The second group, divided into two, prefers (tarfib) ma~labah over na§§· 
Some maintain that when the ma~la~ah is affirmed by the general tenor 
of the Shari c ah, than such a ma~la!zah is conceived to be "sanctioned" by 
the Shari c ah. This means that if it clashes with a legal proposition which 
was not directly recorded in the nass (qa{i) but was rather inferred 
({anni) then preference ought to be given to the ma~la[iah. Among this 
group are the ~anafis and the Mfilikis. 25 
Abu Ijanifa sanctioned the practice of giving zakat to BanIT Hashim 
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despite a clear ruling of the Prophet against such an act.26 The prophet 
is reported to have said: "[The consumption of] ... [zakat] is not 
permissible for Mul]ammad and his progeny because it is the awsakh 
( dirt, filth) of man. "27 This is a clear example where Abu J:Ianifah ruled 
in favour of m~lal)ah ( istil)san) despite the existence of conspicuous 
textual evidence to the contrary. 
The first Caliph, Abu Bakr declared war upon those "Muslims" that refused 
to pay zakat, despite the prophetic saying: I was instructed to engage in war 
against men until they declare, there is no God but Allah, thereafter, their 
lives and wealth are safe. 28 
The other section of the group that prefers ma~lal)ah over naH, feels 
that m~lal)ah is the very quintessence of religious law. Relig1ous law 
was founded upon the principle of ma~lal)ah, therefore it must assume 
primary status. Najm al-Din al-'fufi (716/1316) is among the most famous-
of this group.29 This view accords m~lal)ah the status of an independent 
legal principle.30 This meant that the application of mll§la~ah was valid 
even though it contradicted textual evidence. Scholars have regarded 
al-Tufi's extreme position on the issue of mll§lal;,.ah with severe skep-
ticism. They ruled that his position contradicts the general consensus 
and therefore must be rejected. This position was also attributed to 
Malik to a lesser degree. 31 
A third, more moderate position is attributed to some Shafi cis and to 
J}anafis in general. They espoused the view that the application of 
ma~la~ah is valid even though it is not directly supported by textual 
evidence, provided it is similar to those maslahahs (pl. ) which are 
. . 
unanimously accepted or which are based upon the maq'"i4id (intent) of 
the law.32 This group holds that the naH must at all times be given 
preference, except in the case where: 
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a) the m~laJ;tah is rooted in such a dire urgency, not merely founded 
upon a need assumed by the jurist. 
b) the urgency must be of a universal nature, it must not be peculiar to 
a certain strata on the community.33 Al-Ghazzali and Amidi are among 
this group.34 
The first notion of ma~laJ;tah as described by Imam al-~aramayn al-
Juwayni (438/1047) possess a remarkable resemblance with the older 
concept of qiyas. In fact it would be not be incorrect to assume that this 
was just another term for qiyas. 
It is my contention, that although the first and the third positions are in 
theory the most widely accepted positions of the classical jurists, it did 
not mean that in practice the second position was totally discarded. The 
wisdom underlying this contradiction between theoretical rejection and 
practical application35 will soon become clear in our analysis. 
From the brief analysis of the concept of m~laJ;tah it is clear that the 
freedom which it enjoyed during its formative period36 became gradually 
restricted by prudent jurists. On the one hand, m~laJ;tah was limited by 
theological determinism which defined it as a divine dictate.37 On the 
other hand, it became restricted by a methodological determinism which 
was primarily designed to prevent arbitrariness in the form of unbridled 
personal discretion. This was achieved by subjecting m~la~ah to the 
strictures of qiyas and linking it to a more definite basis. 
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2. 3 Disparity between Theory and Application of Ma~la\)ah. 
The insistence upon basing or deducing laws from the stock of existing 
rulings of the Shan cah, to the exclusion of all other extra-legal38 con-
siderations has been viewed by some as a negative and unjustified 
restraint. The latter position was in particular oblivious of social need 
and change. 39 
What becomes very clear in the writings of the latter jurists40 is that any 
attempt to admit the legitimacy of distilling41 from the "bottom" (realm of 
reality) was contemptuous. The use of profane reality as a basis to realize the 
sacred was, at least in theory, absurd. Hence, any practical precedent in which 
the concept of m~la'{iah was used is very seldom cited, thereby reducing the 
entire debate to the theoretical world of the scholars. 
In his study of the doctrine of ma~la~ah as an ethical concept during 
medieval Islam, Hourani observed that there existed two theories of 
value in medieval Islam.42 The first theory of value he termed "objec-
tivism" referred to that value which had real existence.43 The second 
theory of value which he called "theistic subjectivism" referred to those 
values that were determined by the Will of God.44 The theory of objec-
tivism is based upon the existential reality of values, whereas the theory 
of "theistic subjectivism" was rooted in the realm of the ideal. The 
doctrine of ma~la'{iah tended towards "objectivism". 
The question of how law is to be applied without being transformed from 
an eternal ideal into the world of experience (reality) is still largely an 
unresolved enigma fraught with ambiguities and contradictions between 
theory and practice. While the western jurist is accustomed to dealing 
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with law as an exclusively existential phenomenon, relegating the ques-
tion of its relation to theology to a completely separate field of study, 
classical Muslim jurists tended to combine their attention to law and 
theology without drawing any clear distinction.45 This state of affairs 
promoted a degree of flexibility and enabled the jurist to oscillate 
betwee~ the ideal and the real in practice.46 However, no such flexibility 
was feasible in theory.47 Hence, we find the conspicuous absence of the 
citation of practical examples of cases which were considered illegal 
because they were based upon the concept of m~la~ah. The law books 
lack examples of the application of the doctrine of m~lal)ah to the 
public domain simply because they were in breach of certain legal 
principles. 
On the other hand, rulings existed which were in direct contradiction of 
the established legal principles. This is a clear example of how easy it 
may be to prescribe rigid principles to govern the application of the law 
without a corresponding effect in practice. It would seem that in theory, 
the jurist was obliged to adopt a rigid posture vis a vis the doctrine of 
m~la~ah,48 but when faced with the practical need to apply it, he would 
be more flexible. This apparent dichotomy of the theoretical and the 
practical spheres, was not the result of juristic incompetence, but rather 
the genius of juristic skills. The process of passing judgment is informed 
and influenced by many factors, legal and extra-legal. It is therefore 
imprudent, and indeed not possible, to delimit precisely what extra-legal 
factors must be considered, because each situation is unique. As the 
doctrine of maslahah is much too broad a category, its use as a legal basis 
. . 
poses tremendous problems for the legal theorists. On the one hand, 
ma~la~ah is indisputably a vital ingredient in any sound ruling, and on 
the other hand, it is much too illusive a concept to accept a rigid legal 
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definition. Its application therefore becomes a matter of judicial skill 
based on experience rather than on theory.49 
Ideally, the doctrine of m~la~ah implies that the overall welfare of the 
Community overshadows any particular legal consideration, especially 
of the individual. The general right or duty is more important than the 
particular one, not on a quantitative numerical basis (as if two rights 
were regarded as more important than one), but because of the universal 
character of the general right. However, in practice it is difficult if not 
impossible to avoid human estimation of social needs and demands in 
the application of maslahah. Here, absolute and conclusive principles 
. . 
can seldom,if ever, be applied unequivocally. The most that one can 
usually do is to make more or less an educated assessment of which 
course of action is more likely to produce the most desired results for 
that particular situation. Moreover, since no two real life situations can 
be completely identical, it is virtually impossible to prescribe absolute 
principles governing all possible situations. Each application of m~-
la~ah must therefore be treated on merit which implies a degree of 
subjective judgment. 
It is precisely this consideration that compelled the jurists to restrict this 
utilitarian methodology to the non-devotional aspects of the law.50 The 
devotional ( cibaaat) aspects belong exclusively to a spiritual category 
in which revelation is a more explicit and adequate, eternal guide. The 
official policy in relation to cibadah is therefore one of tawqif (restraint, · 
abstinence); meaning restriction to what is specifically commanded by 
the texts. These are assumed to bear spiritual rather than material 
benefits, which are not rationally discernable.51 
The doctrine of maslahah is therefore easier defined in terms of the 
. . 
parameters in which it ought to operate ideally, because the parameters 
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are easier recognized in theory than in practice. On the other hand, it is 
virtually impossible to implement the doctrine of maslahah by rigidly 
. . 
sticking to the parameters defined by the jurists, because each individual 
case which warrants the application of m~la~ah is to some extent 
unique. Therefore, the reality or the urgency of the needs must dictate 
the parameters rather than the legal theory. 
This is supposed by the doctrine of necessity (iq,tirar, <Jarurah) which 
made allowances for the law to be set aside in the event of extreme cases. 
Although this doctrine enjoyed currency among the jurists, it was not 
directly associated with the concept of ma~la~ah, pertaining as it does 
to matters of extreme necessity, involving decisions of life and death. 
The Qur'anic concession for "necessity" are indeed numerous and 
pertain to matters of cibaaat and mucamalat (non devotional matters). 
For example, the Qur'an permits the eating of forbidden food in cir-
cumstances of extreme hunger (2:173). While on journey, it is lawful to 
postpone the observance of the fast and to reduce the prescribed prayer 
(2:184). This is a concession based entirely upon specific exigencies.52 
Al-Ghazzali (d. 505/1111) devoted a great deal of his effort on the 
elaboration of the doctrine of maslahah. I have chosen al-Ghazzali's 
approach and analysis of m~la!zah53 as a classical example of the or-
thodox notion of maslahah. 
2. 4 AI-Ghazzali and the Doctrine of Maslahah. 
• • 
Al-Ghazzalrs view is that whatever promotes the preservation of the 
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maq~id of the din54 is termed m~la!:zah and whatever fails to preserve 
them is termed mafsadah (defilement) and its eradication is m~la~ah.55 
He divides m~la~ah into three broad categories. 
1.) M~lal)ah that is based upon textual evidence (n~~). 
2. ) M~lal:zah denied by, or which contradicts then~~· 
3. ) The third type is neither supported by, nor denied by textual evidence. 
The first category is acceptable and forms the basis of qiyas. 56 The second 
type of m~la~ah is rejected. The element of ma~la!:zah embraced by the 
third category, which is termed mafla~ah al-mursalah, is further 
analyzed in terms of its strength (quwwah).51 
Maslahah, in terms of strength, is graded into darurat (necessary, indis-
. . . 
pensible), ~ajat (need), and ta[zsinat (refinement). The preservation of 
the maqafid ("five objectives") is covered in the grade of <J,arurat. The 
second grade consists of those m~la!Jahs which are not essential per se 
but are important for the promotion of general welfare.58 He cites the 
example of the need to appoint a trustee to administer the affairs of a 
minor. Satisfying such a need promotes general welfare in the com-
munity. The third grade of maslahahs are designed to add refinement to 
. . . 
conduct and method.59 
Al-Ghazzali treated the doctrine of m~lal:zah al-mursalah with cir-
cumspection. He subjected it to strict scrutiny in terms of textual 
evidence. Secondly, he gave preference to qiyas and refused to recognize 
it (m~la{iah al-mursalah) as an independent principle of legal reason-
ing. 
From a theological point of view, al-Ghazzali found it problematic to 
accept m~la~ah al-mursalah as a concept of human utility, independent 
of God's determination. In order to decide that something is m~la!:zah, 
even to say that God's commands are based on m~la!J-ah, implies the 
acceptance of some external criterion.60 Al-Ghazzalrs attempt to 
.• 
AI-Ghazzati and the Application of Ma~la~ah. Page 42 
theologize the concept of ma~la!J,ah was taken to its logical conclusion 
by al-Razt ( 545-606/ 1148-1210)61 It would seem that Razt developed 
this objection and gave it a specific theological bias by arguing that to 
attribute the consideration of ma~la{iah in terms of human utility to 
God's commands, is to attribute causality to His acts. This position was 
theologically untenable.62 
2. 4. 1 AI-Ghazzali and the Application of Ma~lal)ah. 
Al-Ghazzfilt cites an example of the case in which the unbelievers shield 
themselves with a group of Muslim captives. If the Muslims hold back 
from them they will attack, overwhelm the territory of Islam and kill all 
the Muslims. If, however, the Muslims strike at their (human) shield, 
they will kill innocent Muslims who have committed no wrong, and 
there is no allowance in the Shari cah for such action. Otherwise the 
unbelievers would gain the advantage over all the Muslims and annihi-
late them, and then kill the prisoners as well. It may rightly be said that 
the captives will be killed in either case. Faced with such a situation, 
preserving the greater body of Muslims is closer to the intent (maqZ4id) 
of the Law. For we know that the Law intends stopping it altogether if 
possible. If we cannot stop it altogether, we can at least minimize it. 
This would be a case of resorting to a ma!la~ah known as necessity, 
since we know it to be an intent of the Law not by any particular 
indication or specific source, but by indications free of any restrictive 
definition. 
But securing the intent by this means, namely by killing an innocent 
person or persons, is unusual (gharib) and finds support in no particular 
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source. Thus, it is an example of a ma~lafiah not determined by analogy 
from a particular source, but is inspired by three conditions: 
(1) it is. a matter of vital necessity ((jarnrah). (2) it is a case of clear cut 
certainty (qat ~'iyyah)63 (3) its importance is universal.64 
Whether al-Ghazzairs claim is justified is another matter. It might easily 
be argued that his conception of what constitutes a vital necessity, or 
what is certain and universal is inevitably subjective.65 Al-Ghazzali cites 
another example to emphasize his point; in the case of a floundering 
ship, the lives of a limited number of persons would be at stake and 
therefore it would not be lawful to throw one person overboard to save 
the rest. Nor may a group who are starving draw lots and practice 
cannibalism on one of their number, because the m~la!zah would not 
be a universal one.66 
Al-Ghazzali draws a clear distinction between m~la!zah based upon the 
weight of numbers and the ma~la~ah based upon the principle of univer-
sality. For an unlimited and universal number there is a different and 
stronger case than for simple preference of the greater number. In the 
case where the entire Muslim populace is facing imminent annihilation, 
it must be acknowledged that the shedding of forbidden and innocent 
blood must be weighted against the fact that in abstaining therefrom, an 
unlimited amount of innocent blood will be shed. We know that the Law 
gives preference to the universal over the particular, and therefore, 
preserving the people of Islam from the onslaught of the unbelievers is 
more important in the intent of the Law than preserving the blood of a 
few individuals. This is clearly indicated by the intent of the Law, and 
what is clearly indicated needs no support from a source.67 
This last sentence is crucial to the debate. The principle of preference 
which al-Ghazzali has appropriated, as he admits, is not based directly 
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on textual evidence as to justify qiyas, yet he maintains that it is un-
deniably present in the clear intent of the law. He continues: 
Every ma~la!Jah that does not consist of implementing the 
understood intent of the Qur'an, Sunnah, and //ma", is 
therefore foreign and inappropriate to the operations of the 
Law. It Is therefore void and rejected, and whoever has 
recourse to It Is arrogating the power of legislation, Just as 
whoever uses lstl1Jsan88 is legislating. Every valid ma~la!Jah 
Is based on Implementing the Intent of the Law, which must 
be determined by the Qur'an, Sunnah, and ijmac and must 
not fall outside the scope of these sources. But It Is not 
called qlyas but rather ma~la!Jah mursalah, because qiyas 
Is a well-defined source in itself, while we know that the Law 
Intends application of the ma~lalJah not by one single In-
dication, but by unlimited Indications in the Qur'an, Sunnah, 
and the context of circumstances; and because of this 
diversity of Indications, it Is called ma~la!Jah mursalah. As 
long as maslahah Is Interpreted to mean conservatism of 
. . 
the Intent of the Law, then there is no room for argument In 
following It; rather, It should be accepted as a basis for 
Judgement without dispute. Insofar as we have acknow-
ledged disagreement, that has been the cases of two op-
posing ma~laf)ahs and Intents, In which case preference 
must be given to the stronger. 89 
Thus it is clear that al-Ghazzali insists that the absence of any direct specific 
textual evidence does not imply the absence of any textual backing at all, 
because to him the intent of the text is in certain circumstances equal to the 
text. 
Some scholars will maintain that there remain certain deficiencies in the 
example quoted. Firstly, it would have been much more useful for 
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al-Ghazzali to have analyzed an example of an existing ruling in which 
the concept of ma~laJ:iah was applied. The example quoted is one of 
extreme rarity, the possibility of its occurrence is so remote as to consign 
it to the large stock of useful fiction. The example implies that the 
unbelievers' act of shielding behind the Muslim captives will undermine 
the entire Muslims' defence to an extent that they are exposed to 
annihilation. Although it may be conceded that, at most, it will inhibit 
the Muslim's striking ability, but to imply that it will impair their defen-
ses, is an undue exaggeration. The idea of the unbelievers using a human 
shield to annihilate the entire Muslim population seems devoid of strict 
practical significance thereby allowing al-Ghazzali (in his example) to 
translate the ideal into "practical reality" with the flexibility needed to 
suit his legal theory. 
In other words, the example was created to suit his conception of 
ma~laJ:iah. It would seem that there is a major advantage in constructing 
hypothetical examples. They could be constructed by the jurist to suit 
his legal theory, and overlook the real life situation. Compatibility 
between the hypothetical example and the jurists theory is simple, as is 
seen in al-Ghazzalrs example. 
Problems often develop when attempts are made to legally justify real 
life examples.70 It is one thing to cite an example of a ruling that was 
passed on the basis of an extra-legal principle, but quite another to 
delineate all the factors that influenced that ruling, especially if that 
information was never recorded by the ruling jurist. 71 This inevitably 
leads to the act of "attributing" motives to the ruling jurist.72 
Be this as it may, al-Ghazzali's example is still invaluable because it 
serves to underscore the theory that legitimate social needs were taken 
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into account in classical legal theory. This point is clearly seen in the 
works of Ibn Nujaym, the famous ~anafi jurist. 
3. Social Exigencies as Extra-Legal Propositions. 
In his famous work, al-Ashbah wa al-Naza'ir, Ibn Nujaym ( d.970/1563) 
extrapolated the main principles (kulliyyat) of Islamic law based upon 
the l):anafi school, some of which deal exclusively with social conditions 
and needs.73 Under the head "difficulty warrants relief''74 he goes to great 
lengths to analyze sev,n factors; (1) travelling (safar), (2) illness (mar<!,), 
(3) coercive force (ikrah), (4) forgetfulness (nisyan), (5) ignorance 
(jahl), (6) universal affliction tumum al-balwah), and (7) deficiency 
(naqs) that warrant leniency (takhfif). 15 The philosophy that underpins 
the discussion of these seven factors is clearly one of leniency, tolerance, 
and indulgence. Hence, the law is structured in such a manner as to 
incorporate provisions for such social phenomena.76 What comes clearly 
across in his discussion is that, with the exclusion of the first, the 
evaluation of the remaining six factors cannot escape a degree of sub-
jectivism. Hence, he avoids the arduous task of providing a clear defini-
tion to all these factors, settling for the enunciation of numerous 
examples of how the law was applied to such social phenomena. His 
other principles are that "harm is to be eliminated"77 and "prevailing 
norms tadah) are (legally) admissible".78 
Ibn cAbidin draws heavily on Ibn N ujaym 79 in his analysis of the concept 
of curf, making no distinction between curf and cadah (habit).80 
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3. 1 cUrf or the Prevailing Norms. 
As a noun from the verb carafa "to know", it meant what is known. That 
which is known and acceptable to a community is known as cwf. The term 
gradually acquired a social value when the "known" becomes the 
familiar, the customary, the good, as distinguished from the unknown 
and strange (gharib). It is in this sense that the terms cur/ and ma cnif are 
understood in the Qur'an.81 
According to the orthodox jurists82 one cannot arrive at what is good or 
what is evil except through divine revelation.83 Human reason and curf 
cannot be relied upon to differentiate between good and evil.84 There-
fore, they contend, when God ordered that good should be done and that 
evil should be shunned, He could not have meant by curf and ma cruf 
the good which reason or custom decrees to be such, but rather what He 
commands.85 On the other hand, there existed the legal maxim "whatever 
the Muslims find good, is good in the sight of God". This maxim was 
attributed to the companion, Ibn Mas cud, and not the Prophet. The term 
"Muslim" in this context was conceived by some of orthodoxy to be the 
mujtahid and not the ordinary Muslim. 86 . 
Tension between legitimate social needs, as portrayed by the prevailing 
social norms turf), and the duty to control and regulate those norms in 
. the light of the Shari cah, has always constituted a major problem for the 
legal theorist who pursues a balance between the two. 
lbn cAbidin ( d. 1256/1836) dealt extensively with the principle of curf in 
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his Risalah (tract) entitled Nashr al-cUrf fi Bina Ba er!, al-Afikam cala 
al-cUrf. He disti~guishes between two types of curf, the general tam) 
and the special (kh~~).s7 If the general curf entirely contradicts then~~' 
it cannot be followed; but if it runs counter to certain aspects of then~~' 
the curf acts as a limiting factor on the n~.y. If it is a special curf, it may 
not be followed.ss 
cUrf,argues lbn Abidin, had a profound effect upon the rulings of the 
former jurists. Customs which prevailed during the time of the former 
jurists were always taken into account when afatwah (judicial decree) 
was passed.s9 He maintains that general curf should supersede a general 
rule and a special curf should supersede a special rule. Had the former 
jurists lived in later times they would have based their rulings on the new 
curf.90 
To illustrate this point, Ibn Abidin cites numerous91 practical examples. 
He deals with the problem of curf on two levels. On the first level, he 
analyzes the curf that opposes the n~1 and on the second level, he 
scrutinizes the curf that contradicts previous jurists' rulings (prece-
dent).92 
3. 3 cUrf vs Nass • 
•• 
According to the prophetic injunction, gold must be sold by weight 
(wazn) and not by measurement (kayl). 93 Despite this direct prophetic 
injunction, Imam Abu Yusuf ( d. 798) ruled that gold could be sold by 
measurement (kayl) because it was the established practice turf) of the 
merchants of his time. After citing this example, lbn Abidin comes out 
in defence of Abu Yusuf. He rejects any attempt at discrediting Abu 
Yusuf for ruling in favour of a commercial practice, which appears to 
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run against the grain of a direct prophetic injunction. What this ruling 
of Abu Yusuf implied, explains Ibn Abidin, was that the prophetic 
injunction (na~~) was in line with the prevailing practice at that time. 
[Therefore] the na~~ during that time was In conformity with 
the norm {iidah). 94 Had the prevalllng norm been different 
during that tlme,[at the time of the prophetic Injunction] the 
na~~ would have conformed to It. 95 · 
This type of legal argument, (which was adduced in order to substantiate 
Abu Yusuf's ruling) if accepted as valid, must constitute grave problems 
for legal theory. This argument raises more questions than it purports to 
answer. What criteria is to be used in evaluating the curf? One could 
use this argument to justify virtually any prevailing norm by simply 
asserting that, had the law been revealed in this day and age, it would 
have conformed with the prevailing norm. Ibn cAbidin's answer implies 
that n~~ is regulated by curf rather than curf being regulated by n~~-
Under the circumstance, Abu Yusuf's ruling is not nearly as controver-
sial as the argument forwarded to substantiate it.96 
Although Ibn cAbidin succeeds in explaining the important ramifica-
tions of Abu Yusuf's vital ruling, he fails to produce an acceptable 
argument (in terms of legal theory) to substantiate it.97 Had Abu Yusuf 
not sanctioned the selling of gold by kayl (measurement, pieces), it 
would have meant that the prevailing commercial practice of paying for 
merchandise in the form of gold pieces ( dirhams) would not be per-
mitted, unless each gold piece is precisely weighed. Due to the disparity 
of weight found in the many types of gold coins minted by the numerous 
Sultans,98 it would have resulted in commercial chaos to stipulate that 
each different piece of gold ( coin) should be valued in terms of its 
r 
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precise weight.99 In other words, the sale of goods should be transacted 
in terms of the weight of the gold rather than in terms of the number of 
gold coins. Obviously, this stipulation has inherent difficulties which 
were acknowledged by Abu Yusuf, who ruled against it. 
This is a striking example of the disparity between legal theory and 
practice. In terms of orthodox legal theory, there is no conceivable way 
in which to justify a ruling that contradicts a conspicuous injunction 
based on ll<lf~· Yet, in practice it continued unabated. 
3. 4c:urf VS Precedenl 
If the curf changes with time and a new curl prevails, Is It 
permissible for the Instant mufti (Jurist) to rule In favour of 
the new curl and In so doing, contradicts the verdicts 
recorded In the books of the madhhab? 100 This R/sa/ah101 
has been based upon this proposition. 102 You should be 
aware (of the fact) that the counter rulings given by the 
subsequent jurists (muta 'akhirun) In opposition to the 
recorded verdicts of the madhhab, were for no other reason 
than the change of times and curl. 103 
This quotation clearly spells out the view of Ibn cAbidin with regard to 
the importance of curf as an extra-legal proposition. Now this is a very 
significant statement from which much can be learnt. First, the prevail-
ing norms ( curf) of a community must at all times be considered as a 
valid extra-legal proposition upon which certain rulings could be based. 
Second, since mores and standards of a community do not remain 
immutable, they are constantly subjected to change. This change in. the 
curf must in turn preempt the revision of the previous ruling based upon 
•· .. i. 
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an cwf that no longer prevails. Third, the context out of which a 
particular ruling emerged must always be scrutinized to ascertain the 
degree of influence exerted by curf upon that ruling. 104 
It is interesting to note that unlike many other legal theorists, who 
usually construct hypothetical situations, Ibn Abidin (d. 1256/ 1836) 
chooses real life examples. 
The following are among the examples cited by him: the permissibility of 
hiring the service of someone to teach the Qur'an; the legality of a sale with 
a right of redemption (ba/ bi al-wafo.');105 and the judges acceptance of 
circumstantial evidence.106 Previous jurists ruled against such practices. The 
Qur'an was to be taught free of charge; a sale with a condition negating its 
finality was not allowed, nor could a judge accept circumstantial evidence, 
because evidence was only considered when given by direct oral testimony 
(witnesses), by admission, or by the defendant's refusal to take an oath 
denying the claim.107 As seen from these examples, there could be no ques-
tion about the vital roie ofcurf in the judicial process. In spite of this, its scope 
must necessarily be restricted to obviate abuse. 
Once again, the legal theorists were confronted with a problem. They 
were compelled to seek a balance. On the one hand, there existed a 
.. 
genuine need to insulate the use of curf (as a pretext to sanction 
anything) from abuse and on the other hand, there existed the real 
dange~ that too many strictures may result in the concept loosing its 
viability and become useless. Ibn cAbidin's tract could be seen as a bold 
and gallant attempt to strike that crucial balance. He neither stifles it 
by imposing unnecessary stricture upon it, nor does he advocate that 
degree of liberty which results in abuse. He achieves this by, firstly 
disparaging the notion that the jurist should at all times be bound to the 
letter of the recorded rulings, and secondly, he entrusts the application 
of curf to the discretion and the experience of the jurist. 
, 
., . ..: . 
0 Urf vs Precedent. 
All the conspicuous arguments and examples ... must 
emphasize the fact that a muft(must not remain confined to 
what Is recorded In the books of the madhhab without any 
due consideration of the times and the ( soclal set up] of the 
community. Otherwise a great Injustice would occur which 
wlll result In more harm than good. 108 
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Ibn c:Abidin believes that even if a jurist (mufti) studies all the legal 
propositions recorded in the law books, he is not qualified to pronounce 
legal rulings until such time that he is fully acquainted with all the vital 
extra-legal propositions, such as the prevailing curf and the social needs 
of the community.109 
Other jurists have failed to strike the perfect balance and opted for one of 
the two extremes. Some opted for placing cwf under severe restrictions, 110 
while others such as al-Qarafi ( d. 1285) elevated it to a definite source of 
law.111 
In this chapter the distinction between extending the law and adapting 
the law was illustrated. The extension of the law was brought about by 
the employment of qiyas, whereas adapting the law meant taking cog-
nisance of extra-legal propositions such as mafla{tah and curf. This 
chapter also serves to emphasize the vital role of extra-legal proposi-
tions and their crucial function in the judicial process. A ruling that fails 
to take proper account of its social milieu, is therefore devoid of judicial 
insight and potentially harmful. 
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tion of these "five objectives" is conceived to be the maqa}id 
(intentions) of the Shari cah. Sa cid Ramadan Biiti, Dawabit al-Mas-
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Chapter Ill 
In terms of the application of the law, classical orthodoxy has a long and 
established tradition. In general, its judicial process has developed along 
very conservative lines.1 
In this chapter I shall endeavour to discuss the effects of the orthodox 
views on the application of the law. Fundamental to the Islamic judicial 
system is the concept of stare decisis (precedent). In a legal system that 
functions on the basis of stare decisis, the accurate identification and 
precise delimitation of the ratio legis (illah) forms the very nucleus of 
judicial activity. I have therefore analyzed the concept of cillah and 
demonstrated its inherent leeways. 
1. Orthodoxy and the Application of the Law. 
The attitude of the orthodox scholars towards law rested upon the 
fundamental proposition that revelation (wa~i) prescribed rules and 
standards that were valid in all conditions and for all time and that divine 
revelation ans'Yered, directly or indirectly, every legal problem. In short 
the divine command is comprehensive and eternally valid.2 The law is 
immutable and eternally valid but required comprehensive and exhaus-
tive ijtihad to ascertain and establish the law in its minutest detail. This 
was accomplished by the past masters (mujtahids). Thus, a comprehen-
sive body of law already exists, which means that a particular rule need 
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simply be identified and applied.3 
According to this view no new ijtihad is necessary for the application of 
the existing law, and the doctrine of stare decisis (precedent, or keep to 
what has been decided previously, taqlid) forms the foundation upon 
which the entire judicial process rests. Its corollary,4 the concept of 
compulsory taqlid, means that precedent is both binding and authentic. 
In terms of the orthodox view, Islamic law is conceived as a system of 
law whose content is more or less settled. This concept implies the 
stability of law. In spite of the vast political, social, economic and 
technological changes of the past fourteen hundred years, society never-
theless should be ordered by the same system of law. It is taken for 
granted that the present Islamic legal system is still the same as that 
original legal system of the Prophet of Islam. It is conceived as a single 
system of law, in which the present is deeply rooted in the past. 
What I propose to do is to identify and demonstrate certain patterns of 
thought frequently found in the application of precedents which afford: 
a basis for drawing a particular legal conclusion from existing 
authorities, while not compelling the instant jurist (mufti )5 to that 
conclusion. We find that although the instant jurist may be apparently 
compelled to a conclusion based upon a previous verdict invoked by him, 
he is in fact not so compelled. 
The primary reason for this delusion of being compelled to a particular 
conclusion, is that in most cases the instant jurist tends to take for 
granted that the ambit of a precedent, that is, the range of circumstances 
for which it is binding, is normally clear and known. Had the instant jurist 
entertained any doubt about the ambit of the precedent, he would not 
have felt "compelled" to a particular conclusion. 
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This chapter is primarily directed towards the contemporary orthodox 
jurist, who is confronted with the problem of having to apply the existing 
law to novel situations and finds himself torn between the binding nature 
of precedent and the need to adapt the law to achieve optimum benefit. 
I shall endeavour to demonstrate the leeways inherent in the doctrine 
of stare decisis which affords the instant jurist the scope needed to adapt 
the law while at the same time remaining faithful to the precedent. 
2. Current Dilemma. 
Training in Islamic jurisprudence in all Islamic seminaries is essentially 
a training in cautiousness and conservatism. Its basis is the application 
of the judicial experience of the past to the judicial questions of the 
present. To meet new wants and needs is to search for new forms of old 
wants and needs. Orthodoxy tends to take for granted that the link is that 
of logical derivation. Certain fundamental principles have always ex-
isted in the original law. In order to decide the instant (new, current) 
case, these fundamental principles we-re there to be used as the basis for 
extending the law. In terms of the doctrine of precedent, a previously 
accepted ruling must have a direct bearing upon the instant case. The 
problem arises where earlier rulings are considered incorrect in the view 
of later jurists. It appears difficult or impossible for those dissenting to 
depart from such precedents. 
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2.1 Rulings Incorrectly Recorded. 
The doctrine of stare decisis has been entrenched to a degree that we 
find the "binding" nature of the ruling is even extended to the recorded 
text of the ruling. This means that if a ruling was incorrectly recorded, 
the later jurist nevertheless felt bound to decide the instant case in the 
exact manner according to the dictates of the recorded text. In his 
celebrated work, Rasm al-mufti,6 Ibn Abidin, dearly illustrates this 
point with amazing detail. Among the many examples he cited, is the 
issue of charging a fee for rendering religious services in the form of 
teaching the Qur'an. The necessity to sanction this occupation was 
brought on by the need to retain the services of the teaching fraternity 
for their otherwise voluntary services, by financially compensating them. 
Without such compensation, the teachers would be without any viable 
source of income which would inevitable lead to a mass exodus from the 
teaching profession. Owing to some error in recording the above ruling, 
it purported to sanction not only the services rendered in the form of 
teaching the Qur'an but also in the form of reading (tilawah) it. Later 
jurists accepted this inaccurate recording of the ruling and used it as a 
major premiss to justify other actions, such as charging a fee for perform-
ing another's Haj, despite this being impermissible in terms of the 
original ruling.7 Ibn cAbidin goes on to quote several interesting ex-
amples of incorrectly recorded rulings which some respected jurists 
failed to detect and became instrumental in perpetuating the incorrect 
recording by incorporating it into their subsequent works.8 He denoun-
ces this misrepresentation and terms certain excesses as "grotesque 
ignorance" (al-jahl al- ca1im).9 He regards it is a display of "irrespon-
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sibility" in matters pertaining to the law of the Sharia c ah and a clear 
manifestation of "pronouncingfatawa without knowledge". 10 This clear-
ly demonstrates the extent to which orthodoxy adheres to the doctrine 
of stare decisis. 
3. Stare Decisis in Islamic Law. 
On the one hand, flexibility appears not to be a characteristic of prece-
dent, while appropriate ~pplication of the law requires a degree of 
flexibility. The binding force of precedent is therefore considered a 
fetter on the discretion of the instant jurist. Even in cases where no clear 
and direct precedent is available, .the present jurist is obliged to consider 
previous "similar" decisions as part of the material on which his present 
decision must be based.11 In cases where there exists a clear precedent, 
he is simply obliged to decide the case before him in the same way as 
that in which the previous case was decided, even if he gives a good 
reason for not doing so. In the last mentioned situation, the precedent 
is said to be binding or of coercive effect as contrasted with its merely 
persuasive effect as in the case of the former. 
The philosophy of stare decisis stems from the basic principle of the 
administration of the law, that like cases should be decided alike. The 
strength of this tendency varies greatly. It may be little more than an 
inclination to do as others have done before, or it may be the outcome 
of a positive obligation to follow a previous decision in the absence of 
justification for departing from it. In the case of traditional Islamic legal 
philosophy, which views the previous classical rulings as founded upon 
divinely assisted and impeccable ijtihad, the binding authority of such 
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rulings becomes further entrenched. Precedent, according to the or-
thodox view, derives its binding authority and coercive nature from the · 
notion that the previous classical rulings are the direct result of brilliant 
and unique efforts of ijtihad undertaken by the greatest and most distin-
guished jurists that walked the earth. 12 Since their ijtihad has seen no 
parallel, their verdicts and rulings have become institutionalized and 
binding upon all generations to come. 
3.1 The Role of the Ratio Legis in stare decisis. 
In a legal system that functions on the basis of stare decisis, the accurate 
identification and precise delimitation of the ratio legis tillah) forms 
the very nucleus of judicial activity. This is so because the cillah (ratio 
legis) is the part of the precedent that is binding. The ratio legis of an 
injunction should not be confused with the reasons that preempted the 
ruling. In the case of the Qur'anic injunction prohibiting the consump-
tion of wine (khamar), the ratio legis (illah) of the ruling will be intoxica-
tion, whereas the reasons for the injunction could be several, based upon 
various factors, be ~hey social, economic or medical. The application of 
the law to novel situations proceeds with the task of judicial reasoning 
by analogy. The first stage of the exercise is the location or perception 
of relevant likeness and similarity between precedent and the instant 
case. The next stage is the most intricate and also the most vital stage of 
the exercise of judicial reasoning. It is the task of determining the 
purported ratio legis tillah) of the previous ruling. In other words, the 
task of discovering the "binding" part of the precedent. The third stage 
is the decision to apply that ratio to the instant case. 
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In terms of the doctrine of stare decisis, the judicial art of extrapolating 
the ratio of a previous ruling constitutes the very life of the judicial 
process of applying an existing law to contemporary life. The ratio legis 
inevitably becomes the "indispensible organic link between generations 
both of men and of emerging legal precepts".13 
It would be this ratio which becomes the source of legitimation and 
sanction of all new precepts. Since the cillah (ratio) is not always clear 
and obvious, the process of extrapolating it results in a proliferation of 
competing notions which becomes a valuable source of leeways. 
3.2 Inherent Leeways in Precedent. 
It is particularly obvious that in cases of disputed law, 14 any one ruling 
based upon a particular jurist's ijtihad 15is not binding per se. Its "bind-
ing" applications is derived only when it is invoked under the doctrine 
of stare decisis, that is, when it is accepted and used as a major premise 
to judge later cases. The range of the choice· of major premises is 
therefore an inherent source of leeways. This vital source of leeways is 
often overlooked because, when viewing previous rulings, the instant 
jurist is often labouring under two erroneous assumptions. He assumes 
that there is normally only one ratio and that one single legal solution 
is available on each matter. 16 He also assumes that this single ratio is 
discoverable and could be delimited by merely examining the text of the 
previous ruling. But this, as we will soon see, is not the case. 
One of the primary reasons why a particular jurist like al-Shafi er differs 
with another jurist say, Abu I:Ianifa, is because the two jurists have 
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extrapolated different, and usually competing rationes from the text 
(n~~). In fact, the books on Islamic jurisprudence are full of examples 
of competing rulings as a direct result of extrapolating different ra-
tiones .17 The rulings on riba (usuary) is a classical example of how 
extrapolating different competing rationes resulted in the difference of 
opinions of the various jurists.18 The extrapolation of different rationes 
invariably leads to different conclusions. Conversely, the existence of 
different rulings based on the same source is an implicit indication of 
the existence of different rationes .19 
3.3 The Development of the Concept of clllah 
.Modern historical and textual studies seems to indicate that although 
the concept of cillah has assumed a vital role in qiyas, the eariy jurists 
seldom used the term qiyas and never the term cillah. Imam Abu ljanifa 
neither used the termqiyas nor cillah.20 Although al-Shaficiuses the term 
qiyas, he uses the term "ma cna al-a~li1' (literally: original meaning) to 
connote cillah.21 In all analogies, al-Shafi ci deems it necessary to con-
sider the reason or the "ma cna'' for which God decreed the law. The 
concept of the ma cna being used as a basis for analogy in order to extend 
the law to a novel situation, is similar to the concept of the cillah.22 He 
argues that when the instant case shows similarity to several precedents 
in the texts, analogy must be applied to the precedent closest in 
resemblance and most appropriate.23 Nevertheless, he openly admits 
that judicial inference must lead to difference of opinion.24 A more 
systematic and comprehensive theory of cillah seems to have developed · 
towards the end of the third century. According to research scholars, 
none of the works that focused on cillah seems to have survived from that 
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period.25 
Al-Farabi's Kitab al-Qiyas al-$aghir expounds the theory of cillah in a 
manner that appears to outstrip most if not all his predecessors. 26 Being 
a logician and philosopher, Farabi had no interest in the scriptural 
material which served as a basis of the jurist's reasoning. His work was 
restricted to the subject of syllogistics. 27 Abu f:lusayn Al-Ba~ri's ( d.436) 
al-Mu'tamadfi U{ul al-Fiqh, which came later, is by far a more elaborate 
exposition of cillah. It was to form the cornerstone of all future develop-
ment of the concept of cillah.28 However, Ba~ri's treatment of cillah is 
extremely interesting in that he justifies reasoning by cillah on the bases 
of public interest not directly specified in the texts.29 
It was great medieval scholars like al-G hazzali that put the final touches 
to the concept of cillah. With his usual detailed and analytical fashion, 
this genius laid out what is still regarded as the most elaborate treat-
ment of the concept of cillah. In his renowned work, al-Musta~fa, he 
thoroughly sketched not only the essence of cillah, but also the methods 
of identifying and extrapolating it. 
3.4 Masiilik-al-cillah (Extrapolation of the Ratio Legis). 
Legal theorists like al-Ghazzali have laid down fourteen conditions 
(shuruf) governing the extrapolation of the ratio legis tillah).30 
In order to govern this crucial hermeneutical exercise and prevent 
whimsical fancies, arbitrariness and unbridled subjectivity to dominate 
it, legal theorists have also stipulated strict criteria to assess the legal 
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merit and worth of the ratio legis. Referred to as the masalik al-cillah, 
(methods of recognizing the ratio) theorists have spent a great deal of 
effort and ingenuity in describing these essential criteria in minute 
detail. 31 The five masalik al-cillah are: 
3.4.1 Na~~ (Textual Evidence) 
On many occasions, the cillah accompanies the injunction, in which case 
it is relatively easy to recognize. In other words, the law and the ratio are 
revealed. For example, in the Qur'an, Allah clearly declares the ratio for 
enjoining the performance of !alah: "l have established 1alah for the 
purpose of my remembrance."32 In this verse the ratio for salah is clearly 
(textually) enunciated. Explaining the ratio for requesting permission 
for entry into another's premises, the Prophet SAW declared: [The act 
of] requesting permission was designed for [ the protection of] the eye. 33 
In other words, it was designed to protect the individual's privacy. The 
protection of the individual's privacy is therefore the clearly recorded 
ratio of the injunction. Once the ratio legis has been (textually) recorded, 
its conspicuous nature obviates the need for extrapolation, which usually 
minimizes the chances of ikht[laf ( differing opinions). The ambiguity of 
the cillah of an injunction is proportionate to the varying opinions 
emerging therefrom. 34 
3.4.2 Al-ljmac (Consensus). 
Once consensus has been reached on the ratio of a particular law, it 
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becomes relatively easy for the later jurist to apply it. For example, the 
establishment of trusteeship (wilayah}35 to administer the material and 
financial affairs of a minor, is directly based upon the law which 
prescribes wilayah as a necessary condition for the marriage of a minor. 
The ratio legis of trusteeship (wilayah) was established by consensus 
(ijmac), and hence, all the affairs relating to a minor will be administered 
on the basis of wilayah.36 Hence, a jurist may apply the law of wilayah 
to a major in the case of a mentally incompetent adult, by claiming that 
the said ratio (minor) implies mental incompetency. Since mental in-
. competence is an accepted feature of a minor, mental incompetency in 
the case of a major must be brought under the same jurisdiction of the 
law of wilayah. Any analogy based upon the ratio established by ijma c 
will be automatically authenticated without being itself subjected to the 
usual scrutiny. 
3.4.3 Sahr wa al-Taqsim. (Research and Elimination) 
This method is similar to the one used by Euclid and other Greek 
mathematicians. It is also used in philosophy. Some scholars (e.g 
Shehaby) feel that it was based upon the Stoic schema whose first 
premise is an exclusive type of disjunctive ("Either-or") proposition 
consisting of three parts ( either the first, the second or the third). When 
two of the parts are successively refuted, the confirmation of the third 
will necessarily be concluded.37 When the ratio legis is neither textually 
enunciated nor confirmed by consensus, it becomes the intricate task of 
the jurist to establish it through the use of sound research and a process 
of elimination. 38 The hermeneutical skills of the jurist is thoroughly 
tested when he is required to extrapolate the ratio[nes] legis of the law. 
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It involves an assessment of all possible cillahs. The, by using the process 
of elimination, he chooses the most appropriate ratio or rationes of a 
case. This is done by isolating what he deems to be the material facts 
from the immaterial facts. 39 In the case of an Islamic marriage, the father 
is said to have wilayah al-ijbari over his daughter. This means that his 
consent is a condition for the validity of the marriage.40 In order to 
establish the ratio[nes] legis of this rule, the jurist must consider and 
isolate the material facts upon which he is ultimately going to base his 
conclusion. After considering all dimensions of the rule, he is left with 
two potential rationes. 
Vulnerability on the basis of age and virginity (bikarah) are in this case 
potential rationes. He could either accept both of these as being the 
rationes of the rule of wilayah al-ijbar, or he could accept one of the two. 
On the basis of research and the process of elimination, usually further 
informed by some textual evidence, he must finally choose what he 
considers to be the ratio[nes]. This is a classical example of a rule which 
yields more than one potential ratio. Imam Shafi ci regards vulnerability 
in terms of virginity as the ratio legis of the rule of wilayah al-ijbar, 
whereas Imam Abu I;Ianifa regards vulnerability in terms of age as the 
ratio legis.41 Although both these jurists adduce textual evidence to 
support their respective positions, the mere fact they differed implies 
that the textual evidence available to them was not explicit enough to 
lead them to a single conclusion. What ultimately decided their respec-
tive positions is therefore not the text per se, but their interpretive 
reading of the texts based upon their individual research and other 
factors inherent in the complicated hermeneutical enterprise. The 
reasons forwarded by the jurist to substantiate and justify his position, 
is termed the ratio decidendi (reason for deciding) and should not be 
confused with the ratio legis. 42 
c 
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3.4.4 Munasib. (Appropriate or Suitable) 
When searching for the ratio legis of the law, the jurist must at all times 
be cognizant of the intent (maqa~id) of the Law-giver (Shari c). The 
intent of the law is conceived to be designed to generate spiritual as well 
as material benefit, and to dispel and eliminate harm.43 The ratio legis 
of the law will invariably reflect this intent, although it will be differently 
nuanced according to the gravity of the situation. Hence, the ratio legis 
must at all times portray the maqa~id (intent) of the law. Legal theorists 
have agreed that the maqci§id of the law are five: (1) Protection of din 
(religion) as reflected in the concept of jihad. (2) The protection of life 
as seen in qifci_s. (3) Safeguarding the caql (intellect), by prohibiting 
intoxicants. (4) The protection of wealth by prescribing severe capital 
punishment for theft. (5) Protecting the nasl (lineage), by prohibiting 
fornication and adultery.When the term munasib is used in relation to 
the ratio, it means that the ratio must display any one or more of the 
maqci§id. In other words, if the jurist extrapolates a ratio from an existing 
law that fails to reflect the maqciJid of the din in any one of its dimen-
sions, it will not be regarded as munasib and must therefore be dis-
carded. It is quite obvious that the maqci§id of the din is an extremely 
broad category and seldom serves as a effective guide. It does, however, 
play an important role in the application of the doctrine of ma~lal;zah 
( especially in the case of curf). Sometimes the prevailing norms turf) 
are sanctioned despite the existence of clear textual evidence to the 
contrary. Such a sanction can only take place when the jurist is convinced 
that through the prevailing norm, the maqcifid of the din will be better 
achieved.44 
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3.4.5 Tanqqi al-Manat (Examination clllah's Properties) 
This exercise entails the examination of the properties of the cillah, 
isolating from it those parts that are descriptive rather than effective.45 
An example of this is omitting ethnicity from the process of judicial 
reasoning in determining the penance of a Muslim Indian who intention-
ally broke his fast. The ethnicity of the Muslim has no effect (athr) on 
the ultimate ruling. Therefore, refinements which accrued to the 
doctrine of cillah were a clear manifestation of the growth of a systematic 
and well structured legal theory. 
4. Orthodoxy and the ratio. 
The orthodox muftis are willing to acknowledge that while the legal 
materials include areas of settled precepts, they also present guideposts 
to a host of alternative solutions which remain legally open beyond these 
areas. However, they tend to think that these areas of judicial choice are 
after all "exceptional". Therefore, they tend to convince themselves that 
they can get along well enough without agonizing too much about 
"exceptional" areas. The problem is, however, when there exist two or 
more competing legal propositions, yielding different results for the 
same facts. Or, even if there is ostensibly only one applicable legal 
proposition, this may exist in more than one'version, each yielding, when 
treated as a major premise, different results for the instant facts. Hence, 
the jurist in all such cases cannot avoid the task of choosing which 
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proposition among the competing propositions or versions is to be chosen 
for the instant case. Post classical orthodoxy seems to assign the task of 
establishing the ratio legis of the law to the mujtahids 46 who possess the 
"monopoly" of discretion in this field. Implied in this view is that the instant 
jurist is not entitled to scrutinize the texts with the intention of extrapolat-
ing the ratio legis unless he is a "qualified" mujtahid. The question is 
whether one can be actively engaged in the judicial process without being 
involved in some way or another in judicial choicemaking (ta,jil;t).47 Any 
judicial process that is devoid of choicemaking is both stagnant and 
anachronistic. Since it is accepted even by the most orthodox jurists that 
judicial choicemaking is an integral part of the judicial system, it must be 
accepted that any method that facilitates the burden of tarjift should meet 
with equal approval. All that I am advocating is that the instant jurist 
should, when confronted with a novel situation, confine himself not only 
to the "accepted"(mufta bihi) rulings by assuming that there is only one 
answer to the current exigency. 
In this chapter I endeavoured to demonstrate the inherent leeways found 
in the process of extrapolating the cillah. I also attempted to show that it 
is not merely the binding nature of precedent that compels the instant jurist 
to decide in a particular manner, but it is rather his choice of major 
premises that compels a decision. 
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NOTES FOR CHAYfER III. 
1. By definition, the liberals (modernists) have as yet no established, 
clearly developed judicial tradition, one which could be subjected 
to scrutiny in order to ascertain how the "mutable view" affected 
. the application of the law. 
2. N .J. Coulson, Conflicts and Tensions in Islamic Jurisprudence , 
p.102. 
3. The orthodox view emphasises the necessity to make taqlfd. 
4. It is common knowledge that orthodoxy has rfgorously clung to the 
notion that: 
1.) The doors of ijtih'iid are closed since the fourth century. 
2.) The need for fresh ijtih'iid does not exist. 
3.) It is obligatory for both culam'ii (learned) and the laity to strictly 
follow (taqlfd) a fixed madhhab. 
Many volumes have been devoted to this ongoing debate, in which 
both the protagonists of the above notions and their opponents 
have endeavoured to justify their respective positions. For a 
detailed discussion on the above debate refer: 
W.Zuhayli U~iII al-Fiqh al-Isl'iimf, pp.477-610. 
Shah Wali Allah, ciqd al-Jfd ff Bayan A[1kam al-ijtih'iid wa al-taqlfd 
(Karachi, 1956/60) 
Mu\iammad bin c Ali al-Shawkani, al-Qawl al-Muff d ff cAdill'iit al-ij-
tihad wa al-taqlfd (Kuwait,1980) 
MuJ.iammad MasiJ.rnllah Khan, Taqlfd wa ijtih'iid (Jalalabad, 1979) 
5. I have also used the English term "jurist" in the place of the tradi-
tional Arabic term "mufti". Hence the term"jurist" will refer to one 
who is traditionally called a mufti, one who is qualified to 
pronounce Islamic rulings. 
6. Ibn cAbidin, Rasm al-11111ftf (Beirut.n.d.), p.10-53 
7. Ibid., p.13. 
8. Ibid., p.13. 
In some cases, as many as ten respected jurists failed to detect the 
incorrect recording. 
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9. Ibid., p.15. 
10. Ibid., p.15. 
11. Ibid., p.18. 
12. W.Zuhayli, U{iil al-Fiqh al-Islami, p.527. 
13. Stone, Julius, "The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi" m The Modern 
Law Review (ed) Lo~d Chorley (London, 1959) Vol.22, p.599. 
14. By the term "disputed law" I mean those laws which do not com-
mand a consensus. 
15. The jurist's extrapolation of the cillah cannot be binding in cases 
that yield more than one cillah. 
16. The problem of "one" ratio and "one" solution is the subject of 
intense debate among legal theorists. Al-Zuhayli describes this 
debate as "ikhtilaf al-tawil" and "ikhtilaf ai-kathfr" (long and mas-
sive difference). W.Zuhayli, Uful al-Fiqh al-Islamf, p.538. 
For a comprehensive study of ~his debate see, ibid., pp.533-552. 
Also, Wali Allah, ciqd al-lid, pp.12-13. 
17. Shah Wali Allah described in detail the causes ( asbab) that con-
tributed to the difference of opinions that among the fuqaha. See, 
Ifujjat Allah a/-Balighah, (Deoband: 1965), Vol.I pp.339-347. 
18. For a detailed discussion on the issue of riba and the extrapolation 
of different rationes by different jurists, see; Al}mad al-Kurdi, 
Buhuth ff al-Fiqh al-Islam (Damascus, 1976), pp.379-399. 
19. Ba~ri, a/-Mu'tamad (Damascus, 1964-1965), Vol.2 p.844, also see: 
W. Hallaq, "Logical Structure in Sunni Theory" in Der Islam (Ber-
lin, 1987), p.57. 
20. For a historical background of the concept of qiyas and cillah, see: 
Schacht, Origins of Muhammada11 Jurisprude11ce (Oxford, 1979), 
pp.99-132. 
Nabil Shehaby's article "clllah and Qiyas in Early Islamic Legal 
Theory", in Journal of America11 Orie11tal Society, 102.1 ( 1982), 
pp.27-46. 
Hallaq, "The Development of logical Structure i11 Sunni Legal 
Theory" .op.cit.,pp.43-67 
21. Al-Shafi ci, Risa/ah (Bombay,n.·d.), p.66. 
·, 
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22. Ibid., p.66. 
23. Ibid., p.66. 
24. Ibid., p.66 
25. W. I;Iallaq, "Development of the Logical Structure in Sunni Legal 
Theory" in Der Islam (Berlin, 1987), p.48. 
26. It must be noted that in the absence of other substantial works on 
cillah, Farabi's work is considered to be among the pioneering 
efforts to produce a rational and detailed analysis of the concept 
of qiyas and cillah. 
27. I;Iallaq, op.cit., p.48. 
28. I;Iallaq, op.cit., p.51. 
29. BaFi, al-Mu 'tamad, p.832. 
30. Al-Zuhayli, U{ul al-Fiqh, p.211. 
31. Ibid., p.220. 
32. Qur'an, (20:14) 
33. ~a{1i{1 Bukhari, trans. by M.Khan, (Lahore: 1979) Vol.8 pp.170-171. 
34. For more details and examples of the various ways of recognizing 
textually recorded rationes, see Zuhayli, U~ul al-Fiqh, pp.222-229. 
I have merely cited two simple examples, one from the Qur'an and 
the other from the A{ladith, in order to illustrate the point. My 
concentration will be focused more on the last three methods, 
because they are not only too often overlooked, but they possess 
the most potential leeways needed to apply the law to novel situa-
tions. 
35. Wi/ayah is this sense refers to general trusteeship, incorporating 
both, inherent (ijbarf), as in the case of the father over his 
daughter, or appointed, as in the case of an executor over the 
affairs of a minor heir. 
36. AI-Zuhayli, U{ul al-Fiqh, p.230. 
37. Nabil Shehaby, "cillah and Qiyas in Early Islamic Legal Theory" in 
Journal of American Oriental Society 1982, p.39. 
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38. Al-Zuhayli, UfiII al-Fiqh, p.231. 
39. Ibid., p.231. also al-Ghazzali,al-Musta~fa Vol.ti 295-296. 
40. Ibn Humam, Fat{t al-Qadfr (Egypt, 1970) Vol.3 p.260. 
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'Chapter IV. 
In the second chapter I dealt with the issue of extra-legal proposi-
tion((ma~laftah and cur/) which are vital sources of judicial flexibility, 
and in chapter three, I examined the inhererit leeways in the c<;mcept of 
cillah. In this chapter I shall examine to what extent these leeways and 
extra-legal propositions play any meaningful role in the shaping of 
current orthodox rulings on matters pertaining to social exigencies. This 
chapter also highlights the many leeways. produced by the "fertility" of 
language. Since qiyas is an integral part of the concept of stare decisis, 
syllogistic reasoning plays a major role in Islamic law. The following 
questions are dealt with in this chapter: To what extent is the judicial 
process controlled by the dictates of syllogistic argument? And, to what 
extent can the judicial process be controlled by syllogistic argument? 
This chapter is primarily directed towards the answers of these vital 
questions. 
1. The Extent to which the Law is Controlled by Syllogism. 
In order to examine the extent to which the law is influenced and shaped 
by syllogism, I have chosen to analyze two f atwahs directly relating to 
current social exigency. 
Al-Azhar in Cairo and Dami cUlum in Deoband, India, have become to 
represent the highest authorities on matters pertaining to the Shan cah. 1 I 
I 
I 
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have therefore chosen a fatwah from each of these institutions and 
analyzed it in terms of its approach towards modern social needs. 
Transplantation of human organs has over the last two decades become an 
integral part of modern medical science. One could therefore classify it as 
a legitimate social exigency. How does Islamic law view this new develop-
ment? Is Islamic law flexible enough to accommodate this important social 
need? 
1.1 AI-Azhar's Fatwah (No.1323). 
As an interlude into the actual question of organ transplantation, the 
fatwah 2 reiterates the Shan cah 's respect and veneration for both the dead 
and the living by citing t~o Qur'anic verses: "Do not destroy yourself' 
(2: 195) and "Do not kill one another: ( 4:29). 3 
The first·part of the fatwah deals with the question as to whether it is 
permissible to cut open the abdomen of a corpse, and if so, for what reason? 
A precedent is sought in the "works of the Fuqaha"' Uurists).4 The closest 
precedent covering some dimensions of the instant case is found in the 
case where a pregnant woman dies and there are indications that the 
unborn child (foetus) is still alive in the deceased's womb. Should the 
abdomen of the women be cut open to save the life of the unborn child ? 
In another instance, is it permissible to retrieve a jewel ( or something 
valuable) by slitting the belly of a deceased who had swallowed it prior to 
his death? 
\ r,. 
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The l;lanafi View. 
According to the I;Ianafi school, it is permissible to operate on the deceased 
in order to save the life of the unborn child. This act is rooted in the duty 
to save and protect life. To save life enjoys greater priority over respecting 
the dead.5 As regards the issue of retrieving a valuable from thedeceased's 
stomach, account is taken of two factors.6 If the deceased swallowed 
something which belongs to him, the sanctity of the corpse enjoys priority 
over the retrieval of the valuable. If he swallowed someone else's valuable 
by mistake, and the injured party could be compensated from his estate, 
then splitting the belly of the corpse is not allowed. If, however, the 
deceased willfully and deliberately swallowed someone else's valuable, he 
forfeits any claim to sanctity, and the retrieval of the valuable by splitting 
the belly is permissible. 
The Shafi Ci View. 
Although the Shafi ci view concurs with the J:Ianafi's in respect of saving 
the life of the unborn child by operating on the deceased mother, it is based 
upon the doctrine of da,iirah. 7 The Shafi ci view uses the analogy of the 
case in which a person is facing imminent death through starvation. He is 
the permitted to cut pieces of flesh from his body and consume it in order 
to stay alive.8 The act of saving a life is regarded as the over-riding factor. 
Therefore, if the chances of saving the life of the unborn child are slim, the 
operation should not take place and the sanctity of the corpse should be 
observed.9 
With regard to the retrieval of another's valuable from the deceased's 
stomach, it will depend upon the injured party who will have the preroga-
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tive to either call for its retrieval, in which case, the slitting of the belly will 
be allowed, or he may forgo this right. If, however, the deceased swallowed 
his own possession, then some Shafi ci jurists feel that it should be retrieved 
because it belongs to the heirs. Others feel that its retrieval is not allowed.10 
The Maliki View. 
The Maliki view allows for the retrieval of a valuable from the deceased's 
stomach, irrespective of the ownership. It does not permit the operation 
on the deceased mother in order to save the child.11 
The IJ.anbali View. 
The I;Ianbali view only allows the retrieval of the swallowed valuable in the 
event of its value being considerable.12 Saving the life of the unborn is only 
permitted if no surgery is involved. In other words, it is permitted to 
retrieve the child through the conventional means.13 
The Zaydiyyah View. 
According to this view, it is permissible to operate on the deceased in order 
to save the life of the unborn.They base their view upon the Qur'anic verse: 
"Whoso saveth the live of one, it shall be as if he had saved the life of all 
mankind." (5:32)14 After stating these views, thefatwah goes on to explain 
that for the purposes of this ruling, it was decided to adopt the views of the 
Shafi ci and the I;Ianafis. 
Once it has now been accepted that it is permissible to perform surgery on 
a dead body, provided there is justifiable reason for it, the fatwah moves 
on to the second part which deals indirectly with the question of transplan-
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tation of organs from the deceased to the living. 15 In order to ascertain 
whether transplantation is permissible in terms of the Shan cah, the status 
of the dead body in terms of purity (!ahur) and impurity (na1asah), must 
first be established.16 
Shafi Ci 's View. 
According to Nawawrs (d.676/1295) view, the human corpse is p.ot con-
sidered to be impure. The prohibition on the use of any part of the corpse 
was aimed at protecting the sanctity of the corpse and not because it was 
regarded as najis.17 
ljanafi's View. 
The ~anafis regard the corpse as impure along with all other dead animals. 
Malikis' View. 
This view holds that the human body is {ahir (ritually pure ). 18 
\{anbalis' View. 
The human corpse will be regarded as {ahir after it was bathed (ghusl). 
Zaydiyyah 's View. 
The human corpse is {ahir. 
Thus far the f atwah established from precedent that the act of performing 
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surgery on a corpse is permissible and that the status of the corpse is fahir. 
The third part of the f atwah deals more directly with the issue of transplan-
tation. 
If one looses a tooth, is it permissible to replace it with another human's 
tooth? The Malikiview holds that it is permissible to replace the lost tooth 
with another human's tooth.19 The J:Ianafis regard it as maknih ( disliked) 
even to replace the original tooth. To use another human's tooth is there-
fore not permitted. The tooth of a slaughtered animal could be used.20 It 
would appear that no direct precedent with regard to the replacement of 
teeth could be found in the J:Ianbali and Shafi ci madhhabs. 
The fourth part of the f atwah deals with the consumption of human flesh 
by one facing imminent death through starvation.21 The J:Ianafis have ruled 
against eating of human flesh, even if it means dying of starvation.22 
Some Malikis have ruled in favour of consuming the flesh of a dead human 
if it means staying alive. Others have disallowed it.23 The Shafi cis and the 
Zaydis have sanctioned the consumption of human flesh, when faced with 
death through starvation.24 
After summarizing the above discussion, the f atwah moves rapidly towards 
its conclusion. The fatwah is satisfied that in the light of the cited prece-
dents, enough scope could be found to sanction both organ transplantation 
and blood transfusion. 
1.2 The Deobandi Fatwah. 
According to the Deobandi school25 , blood transfusion and organ 
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transplantation fall under the same head, namely, the use of human 
components as a means of effecting· cure. The whole thrust of the 
Deobandifatwah is based upon three main propositions. 
(1) The sanctity of the human body (takrim). 
(2) The position of man as trustee over his body (amanah). 
(3) The status of the human corpse in terms of {ahir (pure) and najis 
(impure). 
The fatwah especially appropriates the issue of the impure status of blood 
and other separated parts of the body, and builds up a strong case for 
disallowing blood transfusion. Just before concluding, the fatwah stran-
gely enough, accepts the legal maxim " necessity permits the unlawful" 
and rules in favour of it.26 However, the Deobandi view on organ 
transplantation remains one of disapproval and rejection. The f atwah lays 
out in minute detail the extent to which it envisages the abuse to which 
the human body would be exposed if organ transplantation were to gain 
currency.27 The fatwah also carries a lengthy newspaper report entitled 
"They trade in human corpse" in which it is reported that two British firms 
were supplying different educational institutions with human parts.28 
This act of subjecting the human body to abuse for monetary gain is 
viewed in a very serious light. The issue of monetary gain therefore 
becomes instrumental in disallowing organ transplantation. 29 
It is difficult to follow the reasoning that gives priority to the "sanctity" of 
the corpse over the issue of saving life. Using the issue of monetary gain, 
which is not applicable to the medical field, from which to judge the issue 
of organ transplantation appears to be an over-reaction, bearing in mind 
that the fatwah sanctions the buying of blood to save a life.30 It is even 
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more difficult to follow the reasoning that underpins the sanctioning of 
blood transfusion while prohibiting the use of a deceased's organs in saving 
a life. If blood transfusion could be sanctioned out of necessity, so could 
organ transplantation.31 The two are technically inseparable, as seen in the 
Azhar's fatwah. Either the use of human components are permissible or 
they are not. The fatwah is not against transplantation per se, because it 
permits the use of animal organs for medical purposes.32 Hence, it must be 
assumed that the violation of the sanctity of the corpse must be the basis 
of thefatwah because the other two legal propositions namely, the issue of 
amanah and impurity applies to blood transfusion as well. 
What becomes very clear about the whole construction of bothfatwahs is 
their legalism. Only those dicta which could be admitted as legal proposi-
tions, were cited. It refused to address itself to the issue of social exigency. 
The whole question of saving life on modern terms was totally over-
looked.33 This implies that the whole exercise of saving life must be viewed 
strictly through the lens of the previous scholars whose rulings were not 
informed by advanced medical technology. This in turn implies a total 
disregard for the importance of extra-legal propositions. 
The general tenor of the Qur'an seems to support the notion that the saving 
of life must be one of man's utmost priorities. On the one hand the, Qur'an 
commands us to save and protect life and on the other hand, it sets aside 
all restrictions when life is threatened. Man is therefore compelled to 
employ all his available skills in the protection and saving of life.34 These 
skills cannot remain stagnant and must progress and be developed to the 
. maximum of man's ability. 
The mere fact that the Qur'an explicitly sets aside all prohibitions on the 
consumption of l;taram (forbidden) foodstuffs 35 in cases where life is 
threatened, must be the overriding factor. It would seem that the primary 
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exercise of the f atwahs was to present a syllogistically sound conclusion. 
But, if one were to carefully consider the soundness of the syllogistics of 
these fatwahs, it could be found lacking in many respects. To use the 
precedent of the replacement of a tooth as a premise to judge the issue of 
organ transplantation, which involves the issue of life and death, is syllogis-
tically unacceptable. To use a case in which life is in no way threatened to 
judge a case in which life is threatened, cannot be acceptable. 
The Deobandi fatwah, which posits the notion that the use of the 
deceased's organs tantamounts to a violation of the sanctity of the human 
body, impinges upon the use of language.36 What is the actual meaning of 
according respect (takrim) to the deceased? Does there exist one or many 
different connotations with respect to this term takrim? Does modern 
society understand takrim in the same sense as did those whose precedents 
are being cited? Does not the use of the term takrim in this sense rather 
mean, not to dishonour? It would seem that the use of the deceased's 
organs to save a life, a noble task in itself, cannot in today's understanding 
be considered anything, but takrim par excellence. Modern man is there-
fore inclined not to consider it a violation of the sanctity uf the corpse, but 
rather an act of ikram (honour) to use the deceased's organs to save a life. 
Man has always considered it an honour to risk or even loose his life in an 
attempt to save another's life. Communities have throughout history held 
men who sacrificed their lives saving their fellow human, in the highest of 
esteem. The same could be said with regard the issue of trusteeship over 
the body. Could something aimed at discharging one of the "five objec-
tives"(maq~id) of the Shari cah namely, saving of life, be conceived as a 
violation of trust, or must it rather be considered an obligation to realize 
the clear intent of the law? Moreover, if it is permissible to "violat~" the 
sanctity of the corpse for monetary gain, in the retrieval of a swallowed 
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valuable, why could that permission not be extended to serve a more nobler 
cause? 
The issue of impurity cannot per se function as a major premiss from which 
to judge the question of transplantation. This is so because of the legal 
maxim "necessity permits the unlawfu1"37 which is extrapolated from the 
Qur'anic verse (2:173) Even if the corpse were to be regarded as najis, it 
is not sufficient to prevent its use in the case where life is at stake. 
It is not my primary aim to highlight any logical inconsistencies in these 
f atwahs. The point I wish to make is that the jurists all too often fail to 
realize that a go~d f atwah does not merely hinge upon its fidelity to 
syllogistic argument, but it also relies upon other important extra-legal 
propositions. As long as the f atwah is syllogistically sound, the need to 
consider extra-legal propositions is severely undermined. 
Extra-legal propositions such as prevailing medical norms, legitimate so-
cial needs and contemporary man's understanding of the sanctity of a 
corpse failed to feature prominently in both these fatwahs. It chose rather 
to reduce the entire hermeneutical exercise to syllogistics. The fatwah 
attempts to construct for itself a solid major premise from which a natural 
conclusion would be forthcoming. 
My thesis is not to argue in favour or against the question of organ 
transplantation and blood transfusion. I have the greatest respect and 
veneration for those votaries who delivered these rulings. My concern with 
these fatawa is not to evaluate the final outcome, but merely to 
demonstrate that in reaching those outcomes, there is too much emphasis 
on syllogistic argument and too little or no consideration for vital extra-
legal propositions. Any leeways that these extra-legal propositions could 
have afforded the jurists are either tragically neglected or totally ignored. 
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The highly skilled hermeneutical enterprize cannot be confined to the 
narrow strictures of syllogistic argument. Although I have limited my 
analysis to two fatwahs, a similar trend could be found in most of the 
fatwahs dealing with social emergencies.38 
2. The Extent to which Syllogistic Argument can Direct the 
Judicial Process. 
• 
When we refer, in a legal context to a good or proper conclusion, we may 
be referring to the relation of the conclusion to the premises upon which 
· it is based. It may refer to the question whether the conclusion was derived 
by the employment of valid logical argument (syllogism) from the premises 
used. We must therefore be careful to think and refer to this as a "good" 
logical conclusion. This "good" logical conclusion may not necessarily be a 
"good" legal conclusion. Careful observance of this crucial distinction will 
substantially reduce the inherent danger of confusing a "good" logical 
conclusion with a "good" legal conclusion. Failure to distinguish the vital 
distinction between "good" legal and "good" logical conclusions, invariably 
leads to false assumptions. Among such assumptions is that premises for 
legal argument must at all times consist of pre-existing legal propositions. 
2.1 Legal Propositions as Major Premises. 
The assumption that legal conclusions must be drawn and can only be 
drawn from premises that consist of legal propositions is not always true. 
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We have clearly seen this in the analysis of the doctrine of m~la[iah where 
the jurist is entitled to treat extra-legal propositions such as the prevailing 
norms cwf) as premises from which to derive legal verdicts. 
2.2 Need for Judicial Preference (Thrjpi). 
Thus, the assumption that non-legal propositions may not serve as the 
major premises from which legal conclusions may be drawn, is false. Jurists 
may regard a verdict as "good" law even if the premise from which it flows 
. is not a pre-existing legal proposition at all, as seen in the above mentioned 
examples of curf. (see p.62) 
The jurist is at all times saddled with the responsibility to choose which 
proposition within the range of indeterminacy, or among competing 
propositions, is to be applied to the instant case. A jurist's choice must be 
directed at achieving the best legal (not necessarily the best logical) 
verdict. In order to achieve this goal, the jurist may have to regard an 
available pre-existing legal proposition as inappropriate, because a more 
apt extra-legal proposition is available as a premise for arriving at the best 
legal verdict for the instant case. In the case of Abu Yusuf's ruling on selling 
gold by measurement, an extra-legal proposition ( the prevailing norm) was 
considered an appropriate major premise despite the existence of a legal 
proposition (prophetic injunction) prohibiting such a sale. 
Moreover, the role of logical argument is severely restricted in cases where 
there are more than one existing legal proposition available, because 
logical argument from any particular one of them cannot be decisive for 
the instant legal conclusion. What is then decisive is the choice as major 
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premise of one rather than another of the available legal propositions and 
ultimately, of course, the reason, explicit or implicit, for choosing one 
rather than another. This became very clear in the Deobandifatwah which 
chose to make a distinction between blood transfusion and organ 
transplantation. The major premise of qarurah (necessity) was chosen and 
used as a bases for the conclusion which sanctioned blood transfusion. A 
different major premise, (violation of the sanctity of the corpse) was chosen 
upon which the ruling against organ transplantation was based. Moreover, 
the ultimate choice of premise is motivated by presupposed and often 
subjective criteria of choicemaking. 
The decisiveness of sound logic in cases where alternative legal proposi-
tions or versions of legal propositions or extra-legal propositions are 
available as premises, cannot be the exclusive determinant for the instant 
case. The preliminary need to choose the most appropriate among avail-
able propositions, legal or extra-legal, to serve as a major premise for 
arriving at a legal conclusion for the instant case, is thus a main watershed 
which separates mere sound logical conclusions from sound legal con-
clusions. 
In other words, the judicial process, especially in disputed questions oflaw, 
in so far as it involves such constant choicemaking, is not decisively con-
trolled by mere_ soundness of logical argument from existing legal proposi-
tions. 
The point I wish to emphasize is, in the case where the law is in dispute, 
the mere choice of premise, even from within the body of existing legal 
propositions which is used to formulate the legal conclusion for the instant 
facts, cannot be exclusively governed by those disputed legal propositions. 
A fortiori, it cannot be controlled or governed by mere logical inference 
from these legal propositions. Because logic cannot work to a compelling 
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conclusion except from a major premise which is indubitably the correct 
one, and this is obviously not the case when the law is in dispute. It is one 
thing how far logical inferences from existing legal propositions are com-
pelling and decisive in reaching legal conclusions on disputed questions of 
law. It is quite another when and whether such logical inferences are 
appropriate and binding in other legal contexts as well. This vital distinc-
tion was not recognized in the citedfatwahs. 
2.3 Logical Conclusions as Legal Propositions. 
Converse to the erroneous assumption39 that the premises for legal con-
clusions must consist of pre-existing legal proposition, is the assumption 
that if conclusions are drawn by sound logic from legal propositions, such 
logical conclusions must themselves be legal propositions. This second 
assumption assumes that if we can, from an existing legal proposition, draw 
logically sequential propositions for new current situations, then these 
sequential propositions are themselves legal propositions, binding for 
situations falling within their scope. Hence, we see that the precedent of 
replacing a lost tooth assumed legal status in al-Azhar's fatwah. In other 
words, it was cited as a legal proposition upon which future rulings could 
be based. It is obvious that this precedent was originally based upon some 
other legal proposition, because there is no clear na~~ governing the issue 
of replacing a tooth. This is to assume, even if not stated, that all the logical _ 
implications from existing propositions are also legal propositions. The 
reason why this cannot be so, is because the part of the subject-matter of 
law to which logic is relevant is itself only one abstracted aspect of the 
empirical reality of law, namely legal propositions; and legal propositions 
are normative phenomena rather than facts of existence. In empirical 
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reality, legal propositions operate in a context of certain techniques and 
ideals, that is, of certain ways of acting and mental attitudes of jurists; and 
also in the context of the social,economic, political and psychological facts 
affecting this action and these attitudes. But logical analysis is concerned 
only with the logical relations within the body of propositional material. It 
has to isolate the propositions from this fuller and richer, existential 
context.40 
Furthermore, it follows from this standpoint that logical analysis cannot 
ever fully describe, much less exclusively control actual law. It is for this 
very purpose, that knowledge of the economic, social, psychological, politi-
cal and other factors, that is, of the existential contexts which logical 
analysis of legal propositions omits, is of paramount importance. Ignorance 
of the social context of the law as well as apathy towards it, have induced 
many jurists to strictly confine themselves to the logical handling of legal 
propositions. This exercise of concentrating on the logical parameters of 
the law tends to exonerate the jurist from assuming responsibility for 
judicial choicemaking, which is an integral part of his rulings. In other 
words, the "correctness" of a ruling is sought in its fidelity to syllogism 
rather than to correct choicemaking.41 Such rulings must obviously be 
lacking and deficient when the argument limits itself to the logical handling 
of legal propositions. 
2.4 Barrenness of Logic. 
Once we have established that the outcomes of pure logical procedures do 
not always correspond to what necessarily is the most appropriate law for 
any actual Islamic community,42 a much greater emphasis must be placed 
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upon locating and applying those procedures. Pure logical analysis may be 
invaluable for criticizing existing legal propositions by reference to a 
hypothetical model of internal logical consistency. They may also serve to 
test the extent to which a legal system can be conceived to be a logically 
consistent set of legal propositions. They may also serve for pedagogic 
easing of tasks of understanding, remembering and marshalling of legal 
propositions, but not as an exclusive determinant of a ruling.43 
If it is, however, conceivable that by some marvelous combination of 
knowledge and social circumstances, all the existing legal proposition of a 
legal system could at a particular moment be rendered functionally desired 
and appropriate for conditions of that time and place, and also logically 
consistent with each other. So remarkable a conjecture of normative 
judgments and empirical realities with logical coherence could, however, 
if it were conceivable, only be momentary.44 For, human conduct and 
relations against which we test appropriateness,and desirability, are them-
selves changing from moment to moment. If the imagined body of perfectly 
appropriate and mutually consistent legal propositions were to be adjusted, 
as it must be, to reflect such changes, the propositions of which it consists 
could not, except by an even greater miracle.remain capable of similar 
logical systemization for any length of time.45 
There is a field of intellectual activity in law which is quite distinct from , 
the performance oflegal tasks. Its primary function is rather to concentrate 
on tracing and testing logical relations within a body of propositions. It is 
concerned with logical analysis, which is all too often confused with legal 
analysis. Most jurists are more likely to offer to explain their choices in 
terms of obedience to logic (syllogistically), rather than in terms of 
choicemaking based upon other criteria within legally available leeways. 
It is by the introduction of new extra-legal propositions emerging from 
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experience to serve as premises, or by the experience-guided choice be-
tween competing legal propositions, rather than by the operation of logic 
upon existing legal propositions, that the growth of the law tends to be 
determined. The sooner the instant jurists realize this, the better the 
quality of their verdicts. Even if some reject any attempts to conceive the 
unity of the law in merely logical terms, they are however still saddled with 
the practical reality of this idea of unity as operative in the actual working 
of the law, as clearly seen in the handling of questions relating to modern 
society. Conceiving the unity of the law in logical terms tends to undermine 
the crucial role of extra-legal factors in the judicial process which is 
designed to cope with any changing reality. It is also primarily responsible 
for the disparity which clearly exists between legal theory and the rulings 
of many of the jurists. 
Many jurists still fail to admit that cases do arise which require a judicial 
choice free of logical compulsion, either because a substantial part of the 
facts are of first impression and because there is a conflict of pre-existing 
legal propositions. This is clearly seen in the current state of the judicial 
process where decisions and commentaries still take the form of logical 
derivation and logical testing. 
Part of the solution to this problem lies in reframing current theories of 
precedent. Instead of seeing precedent as containing merely legal proposi-
tions of general force, independent of their original context, to be used as 
major premises upon which future legal rules are to be based, it (prece-
dent) should be seen as illustrating a probably accurate result in another 
context for comparison with the present. 
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3. Packaging of the Law. 
The above discussion shows how a good legal conclusion often arises 
outside the ambit of merely logical operation. Having no existential refer-
ence, logic is totally dependent for its conclusions on the choice of 
premises. Because of the nature of language in which premises are thus 
framed, logic will often point to more than one conclusion, alternative,but 
mutually inconsistent. It is common knowledge that language thus causes 
difficulties which both afflict and enrich jurists.The main problem lies with 
the very nature of ordinary language itself. All legal propositions are 
expressed largely in ordinary language, and are thus endowed with the 
inherent semantic qualities of ordinary language. 
I shall endeavour to illustrate how these ordinary qualities of language, and 
the operational implications which flow from them, constitutes another 
vital source of leeways for the jurists. 
3.1 Problems Presented by the Semantics of Language. 
The problems presented by language to the judicial process involve those 
aspects of semantics which study the relation between words and to what 
these words refer. This is itself a complex phenomenon. It comprises firstly, 
of the reference of the symbol in the minds of the transmitter and the 
receiver of the message, which is the idea to which the symbol corresponds. 
And secondly, the thing to which the words refer, (the referent) cor-
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responding, usually, but not always in the external world to the idea to 
which the symbol corresponds.46 This correspondence is comparatively 
easy to see in the case of a tangible entity like a car, where we can link the 
reference as well as the referent to a physical entity easily perceptible and 
recognizable by the physical senses. The recipient of the message can thus 
feel safe to believe that the reference in the mind of the transmitter is 
identical, or close to the reference in his own mind because the referent is 
a tangible entity. 
Things get much more confusing and complicated when we move to such 
non-tangible referents, as maslahah, istihsan and maqasid. 
. . . . 
There is in such cases no entity perceptible by the senses as a referent which 
guides the recipient of the message to the reference in the mind of the 
transmitter, or guides the observer to the reference in both these minds. 
In such cases, the chances are radically reduced of the recipient's reference 
being identical to the transmitter's. 
Language is regarded as being plurisignative because words are symbols, 
and they have no meaning per se:Their meaning consists in the references 
in the minds of persons between whom they are used as a means of 
communication. Among the effects of this is that words may have different 
and occasionally opposite connotations which in turn may change through 
the stream of time in which they are used. Although words may potentially 
bear many meanings as they appear in different verbal contexts and at 
different points in time and space, the number of possible meanings can· 
conceivably be reduced on a particular occasion to a limited number of 
meanings. This could be done by reading the words syntactically in their 
sentences and reading the sentences in their contexts. The context in which 
the word is used becomes the ultimate determinant of its meaning. 
It thus become crucial for jurists to recognize that, in addition to the diverse 
meanings born out by a symbol at any one time, the symbol itself changes 
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or acquires a prolif era ti on of meaning in the process of human activity in 
time. The changes of meaning depends on the unfolding of social life and 
its bearing on language usage in the course of time. A word may not only 
change, but reverse its meaning; for example, the word "invaluable" at one 
time meant "valueless".47 Bearing in mind the fact that the content of the 
symbol often becomes in time emancipated from the reference in the mind 
of the original communicator, it becomes imperative for the instant jurist 
to address himself not only to the meaning of the literal word, but more so 
to the referent and its context. 
In order to determine the accuracy of the correspondence of the referent 
in the minds of the transmitter (writer) and the receiver(reader), the 
emphasis may have to shift to the reference in the mind of the receiver 
some centuries later. The jurist of today cannot be expected to be privy to 
the intentions of jurists, especially generations or centuries ago, except 
through the present reference in their own minds of the written words 
recorded by those jurists. 
Jurists of the same era, sharing the same contextual setting, are bound to 
conjure up different connotations of abstract and non-tangible concepts. 
A fortiori, jurists whose contextual settings are centuries apart, will and 
must assume different connotations. To expect all present jurists to assume 
identical connotations in such ubiquitous matters as ma~la{wh, would be a 
pervasive and constant inequity, if indeed, it were substantially practicable 
at all. 
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3.2 The Fertility of Language and the Ratio. 
The assumption that each case has one single ratio binding on all later 
jurists of the same school, cannot be accepted in the face of the fact that a 
potentially unlimited variety of later jurists will be preoccupied in their 
varying contexts with their search for meaning. The semantic qualities of 
language reinforce the doubts .about what can be meant by searching and 
discovering the one single ratio decidendi of previous judgments. Success 
in such a search would require the "complex of discourse"48 of one or many 
jurists, constituting the precedents on a particular point, to be capable of 
bearing only one meaning. Semantic realities of language, as we have 
already illustrated, preclude any such possibility. Such a single meaning 
would have to be discoverable, and discoverable with identical scope, by 
all future generations of jurists, for all future times, despite the vastly 
' diverse and unforeseeable contexts and range of problems that they face. 
Each later jurist cannot avoid reading the words of the precedents with 
such changed meanings as time has infused into them, and in a context 
which includes the problems the later jurist faces.49 If in these circumstan-
ces, we still wish to insist on the present jurist finding the ratio of the 
precedent jurist, I have to say that the present jurist, with the aid of 
hindsight, simply chooses the ratio that he thinks most apt.50 Language and 
in general all ostensive indicators of language serve to anchor discourse in 
the circumstantial reality which surrounds the instance of discourse. Thus, 
in living speech, the ideal meaning of what one says bends towards a real 
reference, namely that "about which" one speaks "This is no longer the case 
when a text takes the place of speech .... A text.. is not without reference, · 
it will be precisely the task of reading, as interpretation, to actualize the 
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reference."51 Most scholars subscribe to the notion that every literary text 
is in some way burdened with its occasion, with the plain empirical realities 
from which it emerged.·52 
Edward Said, in his celebrated work, The World, the Text, and the Critic, 
clearly emphasizes this point: 
My position is that texts are worldly, to some degree they 
are events, even when they appear to deny it, they are 
nevertheless part of the social world, human life, and of 
course the historical moments in which they are located and 
interpreted. 53 
Stanley Fish who has written extensively on the subject, believes that every 
act of interpretation is made possible and given force by an interpretive 
community.54 If this is so,then we must go a great deal further in showing 
what situation, what historical and social configuration, what political 
interests are concretely entailed by the very existence of interpretive 
communities. This is an especially important and complex task when these 
communities have evolved camouflaging jargons.55 
3.3 Language and the ?,ahiris. 
During the eleventh century, there existed a remarkably advanced and 
highly sophisticated school of Islamic philosophic grammarians in An-
dalusia.56 One small group of linguists and theoretical grammarians, are 
renowned for their profound scholarship; lbn I;Iazm, Ibn Jinni, and lbn 
Mada al-Our!ubi. All of them belonged to the ?,ahiri school57 and taught 
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in Cordoba during the eleventh century. They were antagonists of the 
Batinist (internal, esoteric) view that espoused the notion that meaning in 
language is concealed within the words; meaning is therefore only attained 
as a result of inward-tending exegesis.58 The ?,ahiris argued that words 
possessed only a clear, apparent, surface meaning, one that was linked to 
a particular usage, circumstance, historical and religious event.59 The 
?,ahiris vs Ba!inis debate was rooted in the polemics which surrounded the 
approach to the exegesis of the sacred text, the Qur'an. The Cordovian 
?,ahiris rejected the excesses of the Ba!inis, arguing that the obsession with 
language was an invitation and licence to spinning out private meanings in 
an otherwise divinely pronounced, and hence immutable text. 
lbn Mada strongly attacked this view and argued that it was absurd even to 
associate grammar with the logic of understanding. Grammar as a science, 
assumed and very often proceeded to create by retrospection, ideas about 
the use and meaning of words that implied a concealed level beneath 
words, available only to initiates.60 It is obvious that once you resort to such 
a level, anything becomes acceptable by way of interpretation, because 
there can be no fixed meaning, no acceptable control over what the words 
in fact say. 
It would seem that the '.?ahiris wanted to pin down meanings of language 
by reference to some empirically observed core of common language. The 
Qur'an, according to the '.?ahiri school, is a text that incorporates speaking 
and writing, reading and telling (iqra and qui). ?,ahiri interpretation itself 
accepts as inevitable, not the disjunction between texts and its circumstan-
tiality, but rather their compulsory interplay.61 It is precisely this interplay, 
this constitutive interaction, that makes the ?,ahiri notion of meaning 
possible. This theory of interpretation represents an articulate thesis deal-
ing with a text in a significant form, in which circumstantiality, the text's 
status as an event having "sensuous particularity" as well as "historical 
• I 
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contingency", are considered as being incorporated in the text, a solid part 
of its capacity for conveying and producing meaning. 62 This clearly means 
that a text must have a specific situation, which restricts the interpreter and 
his interpretation, not because the situation is hidden within the text as an 
esoteric mystery, but rather because the situation exists at the same level 
of surface particularity as the textual object itself.63 The text itself imposes 
constraints upon their interpretation, or to put it in the words of Edward 
Said, " ... the closeness of the world's body to the text's body forces readers 
to take both into consideration."64 
Hence, whatever a jurist may do, semantic considerations indicate that he 
cannot fix the "ordinary" meaning to be found by literal interpretations for 
· all future interpreters. This is primarily due, as we have demonstrated, to 
the fact that the words of his code which are in common usage at the time 
of its formulation are subject to the principle of plurisignation, and to 
semantic change with the flux of time in which language as a social 
phenomena par excellence, moves. Although there is little doubt that 
some limits can be set on the plurality of meanings by the careful use of 
words, especially technical legal terms, which are less susceptible to 
chance, a word is rarely unisignative. Moreover, no law consists entirely of 
technical legal terms, and the cannon prescribing the literal interpretation 
according to the ordinary meaning is in any case not applicable to such 
precise technical terms. 
3.4 The intention of the Jurist. 
The widely accepted principle of interpretation of legal phenomena, which 
makes the intention of the jurist the exclusive determinant of his code, is 
I 
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also fraught with much of the same semantical problems encountered in 
language. The error of substituting the jurist's intention for meaning of 
language is that it tends to ignore the crucial fact that a written work, once 
created, acquires a meaning which, though dependent on men's usage, may 
be independent· of its author's motives. Interpretation thus becomes 
precisely a search for this meaning. As already noted, the later jurists 
cannot be privy to the previous jurist's intentions, except so far as the words 
used, convey these. A fortiori, succeeding generations, to whom the text 
applies, can only be held bound by the meaning of its words to them. To 
hold them to some pristine intention of the author, even if this were 
possible, would be an unfair imposition that requires all future jurists to 
understand words addressed to them in some meaning which they may not 
convey. Hence, it must be conceded that the original author must have 
intended that his language should bind according to the community's 
understanding of it at the time of its creation, rather than some pure, 
permanent,discoverable meaning. This is the basis of the judicial emphasis 
on the ordinary meaning of words when this does not lead to absurdity. It 
insists that this ordinary meaning should be sought in the usage and social 
situation of the generation in which the question arises.65 In many cir-
cumstances, a good deal of the instant jurist's invocation of the preceding 
jurists' intentions,must be regarded as fictitious and sometimes ritual, 
which is designed to conceal the unavoidable creative choices involved in 
interpreting and applying previous rulings to current exigencies. Some-
times, highly subjective intentions and motives. are read into previous 
rulings in order to give authenticity and plausibility to the current ruling. 
The problem with many classical Islamic rulings and verdicts is, that they 
became canonized without proper recording of the rationes upon which 
they were based. When a classical mujtahid quotes a Qur'anic text in 
substantiation of a certain verdict, it is misunderstood as being the ex-
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elusive determinant of the verdict, but in the light of the above discus-
sion, it must be conceded that the. text per se ·is not the determinant, but 
rather the ratio legis embraced by the text is the determinant. Hence, the 
factors that contribute towards the interpretative exercise of extrapolat-
ing the ratio legis is as vital to the conclusion as the text itself. From this 
semantic standpoint, it becomes clear that to assume that there can be 
only one ratio of a case, and that such one ratio is discoverable by all 
jurists, present, past and future, is to deny the semantic realities of 
language. The purposive nature of language and the complex of symbols 
constituting it, are deeply involved in arriving at a conclusion.66 It would 
virtually be a semantic miracle if in all cases, any one meaning of such a 
complex of discourse should present itself as the only correct meaning 
to all readers. In this semantic perspective, indeed, it is difficult even to 
see what can be meant by searching for the one ratio for the instant case. 
To expect to find such a single ratio is to assume that, what is usually a 
vast complex of discourse can have only one meaning. This is obviously 
a gross repudiation of the semantic insight that whether we are dealing 
with a word, or a judgement, the principle of plurisignation and semantic 
change operate.This was clearly demonstrated by the examples quoted. 
In the Deobandi fatwah the issue of takrim was used as a premiss to 
justify a certain verdict. What constitutes takrim (honour) changes with 
the time and space and therefore any verdict based upon such "changing" 
phenomena, cannot be permanently binding. 
The area of the meaning of each word is somewhat delimited syntacti-
. cally in its sentence, and restricted by th_e contextual environment of 
each sentence, and the whole complex of discourse, by a host of issues 
a~y of which the jurist may appropriate as the issue in the case, and 
moreover by the social situation within which the issue arises.67 
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4. Precedent as a Complex of Judicial Discourse. 
Precedent is therefore not a straight-forward dictum espousing a clear and 
unambiguous directive, but rather a complex of judicial discourse. When 
this complex of judicial discourse is sought to be appropriated by the 
instant jurist as a precedent, the different situations in the later social 
situation may widen the possible area of meaning of the earlier judicial 
discourse.68 The con ti m1 i ng openness of previous decisions to rei nterpreta-
tion of their supposed ratio in successive generations with differei1t social 
needs and experience, was a fact that was acknowledged by classical jurists 
such as Ibn cAbidin: 
My view Is that many of the verdicts arrived at by the 
mujtahid wl.l,1-~ based upon the curf of his time, so much so 
that had the present curf prevailed during his time, he would 
have contradicted his original ruling and rule:Hn favour of 
the present curf. 69 
In summary, then, whatever method of seeking the ratio of the case we 
employ, it must take account of the meaning of the judgment as a "complex 
of discourse". The extrapolation of the ratio from this complex of discou!se 
becomes subject to semantic problems which render quite illusory the 
assumption that there is only one possible correct meaning. These 
problems ensure that the discourse will bear many possible meanings. If 
these many possible meanings of each decision were reflected in one 
correct ratio, it must be considered to be a most extraordinary coin-
cidence.70 The semantic aspects of the ratio problem, when joined with the 
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logical and linguistic aspects already covered, must create ample leeways, 
in which case the central role of choicemaking cannot be over emphasized. 
The idea is to locate justifiable leeways for the play of contemporary 
judicial insight and wisdom. At the same time judicial attention should be 
closely attuned to the context, experience and considerations shown by the 
earlier rulings of the jurists, and to the demands of logical consistency, 
4.1 The Contextual Settings of Precedent. 
One of the most striking features of Islamic law, when compared with the 
two other major Islamic disciplines, namely, ta/sir (Qur'anic exegesis) and 
If adith, is the marked absence of any significant discussion relating to the 
context of the ruling. 
At most, the classical works on Islamic law will enter into detailed discus-
sions as to how loyal and true the rulings are in terms of syllogistic 
argument, to the principles (na~~) upon which they are supposedly based. 
Law books are compilation of verdicts disembodied from their contexts. 
They are recordings of rulings minus their contextual settings. This system 
of recording verdicts without any due attention to the context from which 
they emerged, is unique when compared to other legal systems, such as the. 
British Common Law system and the American Constitutional system. In 
these systems the context which gave rise to the ruling is as important as 
the ruling itself. No future ruling will exclude an exhaustive and com-
prehensive scrutiny of the context of the previous ruling. The ruling which 
is handed down in the form of a judgment clearly reflects and includes the 
train of argument of the judge. His ratio decidendi is well supported by all 
the material facts relevant to the ruling. 
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The problem that continually confronts a Muslim jurist is how to apply a 
previous ruling to a contemporary situation while he is totally left guessing 
as to the precise nature of the context from which the ruling emerged. 
Islamic law is unlike the disciplines of tafsir and ~adith where any applica-
tion or understanding of the text is closely integrated with the contextual 
settings of the text. Hence, any attempt at Qur'anic exegesis must involve 
a scrutiny of the "occasions of revelation" (asbab al-nuzul). The emphasis 
on citing the asbab al-nuzul is indicative of the fact that the contextual 
setting of the verse is ostensibly crucial to the understanding and applica-
tion of that verse. 
In the case of Islamic law, which is recorded in countless volumes, the trend 
developed among the jurists to merely record the ruling and at most, to 
explain how the ruling is justifiable in terms of syllogistic argument. It 
would seem that this crucial development emerged as a corollary to the 
"immutable" view. In other words, the ruling once given, is immutable 
irrespective of the context from which it emerged. The later jurist is 
therefore "bound" to apply the previous ruling without any comprehensive 
scrutiny of the original context. This is to assume that the original context 
had no significant bearing upon the ruling. This in turn amounts to an 
unjustified denial of the many existential factors, be they social, economic, 
and political that interact with the jurist and finally shapes his discretion 
which results in a legal verdict that is best suited to that context, or at least, 
aimed at the context. 
It is common knowledge that many rulings emerged in direct response to 
a temporary exigency which fades with time. The whole issue of "mansukh 
" (abrogated texts) is based upon the existence of temporary exigencies. 
Futhermore, it is inconceivable that an elaborate and comprehensive legal 
system such as Islam's did not take into account the current needs of the 
community and its direct bearing upon the interpretation and application 
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of the law. The point I wish to make is that the instant jurist is at a distinct 
disadvantage when applying a previous ruling without being aware of the 
precise context from which that ruling emerged. It is like having to read an 
answer without having access to the question. Although it may be possible 
to determine from the answer an approximate notion of the question, the 
real sense of the answer can only be conceived in the light of the actual 
question. 
The instant jurist is at a disadvantage for three reasons. 
First, since the previous rulings have been handed down "disembodied" 
from their original contexts, he cannot establish beyond all doubt whether 
the conditions which gave rise to the ruling are identical to the instant 
conditions. Since rulings must be read in the light of the facts of the case 
in which they were delivered, the instant jurist is then compelled· to 
presume that the instant context and the original context are identical. His 
efforts to ascertain the ratio decidendi cannot be brought to complete 
fruition, because the vital indicators are embedded in the "missing context" 
of the previous ruling. Had the context accompanied the ruling, the instant 
jurist would have been in a considerably better position to judge the instant 
facts. 
On the one hand, legal theory demands that every ruling must have a ratio 
decidendi, and on the other hand, the facts from which such a ratio could 
be inferred, are missing. The problem is compounded by the practice of 
later scholars of "attributing" reasons and explanations, which they as-
sumed to be the ratio decidendi of the ruling, to the ruling jurist. This 
practice of "attributing" reasons appears to have been precipitated by the 
jurist's need to vindicate the madhhab to which he subscribed, especially 
in the face of an intellectual onslaught from an opposing madhhab.71 In an 
attempt to establish the superiority of his madhhab 's position vis-a-vis the 
I 
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other madhahib (pl. of madhhab ), the jurist invoked numerous assumed72 
reasons in substantiation of the ruling. 
Faced with no or little prospect of being enlightened by the facts that gave 
birth to the precedent, the instant jurist is inevitably compelled to seek 
justification for his ruling in the realm of syllogistic argument. 
Second, the instant jurist is deprived of the many leeways that would have 
been afforded to him, had he been able to thoroughly scrutinize the original 
context. The extent of leeways will depend on how the instant jurist can 
accurately place the contextual setting of the original ruling. The factors 
that earlier jurist were compelled to consider may no longer be applicable 
or relevant to the instant case, but since this information is not available, 
the instant jurist cannot appropriate those inherent leeways. 
Moreover, when the instant jurist is faced with the prospect of having to 
make a judicial choice from among competing verdicts of the same jurist, 
his dilemma is increased. Legal theorists have grappled with this problem 
and attempted to sketch guidelines directed at stabilizing the complex issue 
of judicial preference (tarjiM. 13 When two or more competing verdicts on 
one issue have been reported from a single jurist, it becomes the obligatory 
task of the later jurists to give preference to one verdict.74 Although the 
legal theorists have prescribed a preference giving methodology (tarji[z 
· bayn al-adillah), they are compelled to admit that in the final analysis, it is 
up to the jurist to decide what the ultimate grounds of preference must be. 
There are too many complicated factors which could sway a decision in any 
direction. 75 A rational explanation for the existence of more than one 
opposing verdict could be sought in the context of the particular verdict. 
If, for the sake of argument we say that verdict A emerged in direct 
response to situation X, and verdict B emerged in response to situation Y 
and finally verdict C emerged in response to situation Z, then.I am sure 
that no jurist need to engage in the highly subjective task of having to give 
Why Omit the Rat/ones and Contextual Settings? Page 111 
preference to any one verdict. Under the circumstances, he is quite safe 
to regard all three mutually inconsistent verdicts as "binding" and 
authoritative in their contexts. In which case, it would no longer be 
(wajib) obligatory to give preference. 
If on the other hand, we are ignorant and uninformed of the different 
contexts out of which the opposing verdicts emerged, we are stranded 
with verdicts, disembodied from their contextual settings, hence exercis-
ing judicial preference is the only option open to us. Some jurists have 
attempted to reconstruct the contextual settings of some verdicts, but 
unfortunately it was mostly aimed, not at establishing the ratio decidendi 
and the material facts upon which the ruling was based, but rather 
directed at determining the time period of the rulings. Once they ascer-
tained which ruling was the later one (al-qawl al-akhir: last verdict), they 
assumed that all other previous rulings are abrogated or retracted.76 A 
classical example of this dilemma is to found in the works on al-Shafi ci's 
fiqh. Imam al-Shafici is renowned to be "fal:zib al-qawlayn" (one with two 
verdicts). Faced with the arduous task of having to reconcile more than 
one mutually inconsistent view of al-Shafi ci, later scholars made a broad 
distinction between the two. Classifying the one view as "new" or "revised" 
(al-qawl al-jadid) and the other as "old" (al-qawl al-qadim). In terms of 
the u~ul al-fiqh, it is impermissible to attribute any retracted ruling to the 
jurist, once it has been carefully established that he made such a retrac-
tion. 77 Establishing the time period of the different rulings, and assuming 
from it that all previous rulings in terms of time were retracted or 
abrogated, is as one can see, reducing the complex judicial process to a 
superficial exercise. If this method were to be accepted, then it would 
mean that all the verdicts which al-Shafi ci gave during his stay in Iraq 
should be regarded as retracted or abrogated, because his subsequent 
verdicts which were recorded in Egypt were in terms of time, final 
(al-qawl al-akhir). This is clearly not so because, had this been the case, 
.. 
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it would not have been proper for the later Shafi er jurists such as Haytami 
and Nawawi to give preference to the "old", (retracted or abrogated) view 
of al-Shafi ci. We find examples of the fatwah (ruling) being passed by 
later jurists in favour of the "old" view. 
Third, the instant jurist's grounds for deviating from the previous ruling 
is severely curtailed and he is virtually imprisoned by the "binding" and 
coercive force of precedent. Had the basis of the previous ruling been 
extended beyond the barren barriers of syllogistic argument to the fer-
tility of language and context, he would have had amply leeway to justify 
a departure from precedent. As matters now stand, the instant jurist has 
no legal room to depart, other than finding a logical loophole. 
From this discussion it would seem that the entire post-classical judicial 
process evolved around the immutable view with stare decisis as its 
operating principle. Hence, in terms of this system which is rooted in the 
doctrine of stare decisis, as long as a ruling is syllogistically sound, any 
future departure from it is effectively frustrated. This was achieved by 
the practice of deliberately omitting the rationes and the contextual 
settings when recording the rulings. By omitting the ratio when recording 
the ruling, future jurists are left with no grounds ( other than syllogism) 
for departing from precedent. 
4.2 Why Omit the Rationes and Contextual Settings? 
Any reference of the instant jurist to a flaw, error or inapplicability of the 
"assumed" ratio of the previous jurist's ruling, is simply dismissed by 
denying that the ratio referred to, was in fact the ratio of the previous 
ruling. 
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Since the ratio of the previous ruling is not recorded, the instant jurist is 
forced into the realm of conjecture which affords the previous ruling the 
luxury of remaining an illusive enigma while at the same time denying the 
instant jurist the vital grounds for departure. At most, the instant jurist may 
assume what the ratio of the previous ruling is, but his attempt to use it as 
a basis of departure is effectively frustrated because it would then be based 
upon a non-recorded, "assumed" ratio which could be easily dismissed. 
Since we have demonstrated the importance of the original or the existen-
tial context and its vital role in the final ruling could serve as an important 
source of leeways upon which any future departure could be based. The 
deliberate failure to accord due prominence to the context in response to 
which a law emerged, could be conceiV'ed, firstly, as a direct result of the 
notion that Islamic law is immutable and once pronounced, becomes 
binding for all future generations, irrespective of the differing contexts. 
Secondly, it entrenches the belief that the ijtihad of the classical jurists are 
not to be challenged or overruled. This is achieved by omitting vital 
potential grounds for departure. In other words, deliberately withholding 
potential grounds for departure is also to effectively elevate the ruling to 
the untouchable realm. To explain, to give reasons, to theorize is to invite 
accountability, to expose oneself to criticism and refutation. This was to be 
obviated if the classical treasure was to remain intact.I have endeavoured 
to show that more than one and often numerous potential,competing 
rationes are to be expected when precedents are invoked, especially in 
areas of disputed law. The present study, therefore, places major emphasis 
upon the crucial role of judicial choicemaking. By judicial choicemaking, 
I mean the task of the instant mufti to choose between more than one, often 
between conflicting potential rationes. In so far as these potential rationes 
offer conflicting solutions for the instant case, no single ratio can strictly 
claim to bind the later jurist. Within the tradition of precedent, we now find 
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enough leeway afforded to the instant jurist to combine many factors, legal 
and extra-legal to arrive at the most appropriate ruling. In addition to this 
leeway is the inherent leeways of language. 
Despite the existence and legitimacy of these leeways, we still find syllogis-
tic argument exerting a the stranglehold over the orthodox judicial process. 
In other words, the barrenness of logic enjoys priority of the other more 
fertile processes. The same set of facts may look entirely different to two 
different jurists.78 The jurist bases his conclusions upon a set of facts 
selected by him as material from among a larger mass of facts, some of which 
might seem significant to a layman, but are conceived by the jurist as 
immaterial and irrelevant. The jurist, therefore, arrives at a conclusion 
based upon the facts as he sees them. It is on these material facts that he 
bases his judgment, and not on any others. Hence, it becomes the task of 
the later jurist not merely to state the facts and the conclusion of the 
previous ruling, but to determine the material facts as seen by the previous 
jurist and his conclusion based upon them. This exercise of determining 
the material facts of the previous ruling is one that is fraught with difficulty. 
There is unfortunately no definite method of ascertaining what the 
material facts of the precedent are. 
In the case where the ruling is transmitted without a statement of the 
jurist's legal reasoning, it becomes virtually a matter of guesswork for the 
latter jurist to establish the material facts upon which the previous jurist 
based his conclusion. Again it must be emphasized that the later jurist is 
again faced with the unavoidable task of choosing the facts he assumes were 
the basis of the precedent. To ignore or disregard the later jurist's vital 
choice, ( of material facts he assumed to be the basis of the previous ruling) 
is to reduce the whole judicial process to a meaningless exercise. 
It is therefore extremely essential to trace the train of thought, the line of 
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argument and the choice of material facts of the previous jurist, so as to 
serve as a guide for the instant jurists. To divorce the conclusion from the 
material facts upon which that conclusion rested, is like removing the 
foundation and expect the structure to be solid. Sometimes jurists think 
that they are in happy agreement on the facts when they in actual fact 
concur in result only. The agreement of the Deobandis and the Azharis on 
the question of blood transfusion is a typical example. 
Having established the ratio decidendi of a case, and excluded all dicta, the 
final step is to determine whether or not it is a binding precedent for the 
instant case in which the facts are prima fade similar. This obviously 
involves a double analysis; firstly, it involves establishing the ratio decidendi 
and the material facts of the precedent and secondly, it entails determining 
the material facts of the instant case. If these are identical, and only if they 
are identical, then the precedent is "binding" on the instant case. If, how-
ever, there exists any doubt as to the identical nature of the two sets of 
material facts then it follows that the precedent is not "binding". Any 
departure from the previous ruling on such basis cannot be construed as 
departure from precedent, because in actual fact, the previous ruling is not 
to be considered "precedent" but rather applicable to a "different" set of 
circumstances. It is on this score that I submit that most contemporary 
jurists have grossly erred. Any departure based on differing material facts 
of the precedent and instant case, is viewed as an unholy "deviation" from 
the assl,lmed "binding precedent". Deviation and departure are conceived 
as "wrong" conclusions irrespective of the leeways presented by the differ-
ing material facts. The point I wish to stress is that a different conclusion 
does not necessary mean or imply departure from "precedent". Departure 
or deviation would have occurred when, and only when, despite the two 
sets of material facts established in the precedent and the instant case being 
identical, two different conclusions are reached. In this case, the later 
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ruling would be considered as a departure from the precedent. In other 
words, to establish a departure or deviation, it is not sufficient to view the 
conclusions. Rather it is essential to establish the identical or unidentical 
nature of the material facts, upon which the conclusions were based. 
Notes for Chapter IV Page 117 
NOTES FOR CHAPTER IV. 
1. These two institutions have over the last two centuries played an 
important role in ruling on matters of social importance. They repre-
sent the orthodox Sunni view par excellence. For a historical study of 
al-Azhar see, Bayard Dodge, At~Azhar: A Millennium of Muslim Leam-
ing (Washington, 1961). 
For an excellent study of Deoband see, Barbara Metcalf, Islamic 
Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 (Princeton, 1982). 
2. Jad al-IJaq, Al-Fatawa al-Islami (Cairo, 1982), pp.3707-3715. 
3. Ibid., p.3705. 
4. Ibid., p.3705. 
5. Ibid., p.3705. 
6. The two factors are ownership and intent. 
7. Ibid., p.3706. 
8. This act of cannibalism practiced on oneself in order to stay alive, is 
not allowed by the I)anaffs. Mufti Mu!tammed Shafi"\ Insani A 'za KT 
Pairvankari (Karachi, 1968), p.37. 
9. Jad al-Haq, Al-Fatawa al-Islami (Cairo, 1982), p.3706. · 
10. Ibid., p.3606. 
11. Ibid., p.3706. 
12. Ibid., p.3706. 
13. Ibid., p.3706. 
14. Ibid., p.3707. 
15. Ibid., p.3707. 
16. If the corpse is regarded as impure (najis) then it goes without saying 
that the use of any "impure" organ will not be permitted. On the other 
had, if the corpse is regarded to be tahir, then only can the question 
of permissibility of organ transplant· proceed. Hence the whole ques-
tion of the status of the corpse is discussed. 
17. Ibid., p.3707. 
18. Ibid., p.3707. 
Notes for Chapter IV Page 118 
19. Ibid., p.3709. 
20. Ibid., p.3709. 
21. Ibid., p.3711. 
22. Ibid., p.3711. 
23. Ibid., p.3711. 
24. Ibid., p.3711. 
25. Mufti Mu~ammad Shafi', Insa11i A 'za Ki Pairva11kari (Karachi, 1968), 
pp.1-40. also; 
"Al-Tibyan Ii Ifukm al-Tadawi bi dam al-Insan" in Alati Jadidah 
(Karachi,1961), pp.122-124. 
The fatwahs of Mufti Mu~ammad Shafi<: is considered to be the 
Deobandi view par excellence. His view will therefore be referred to 
as the Deobandi view. His fatwah is also endorsed by the Muf~i Mahdi 
I;Iasan of Darul cUlum of Deoband as well as sixteen other muftis from 
virtually all the Deobandi seminaries through the Indo-Pak sub-con-
tinent. 
26. Ibid., p.24. 
27. Ibid.,pp.31-35. 
28. Ibid., pp.32-33. 
29. Ibid., p.34. 
30. Ibid.,p.26. If blood could not be obtained freely, then its purchase is 
permissible. Selling blood is not allowed. 
31. Blood is finally compared to the female's milk which is permissible to 
use. Ibid.,p.25. 
32. Ibid., p.30. The fatwah particularly excludes use of organs from pigs 
and dogs. They are considered to be najis. Hence, only those animals 
whose flesh a Muslim may consume, could be used, provided it is 
slaughtered in the prescribed manner. 
33. The Deobandi fatwah only concentrates on the negative side of organ 
transplantation and does not mention any positive dimension. 
34. This is clearly one of the "five objectives" of the Shari cah 
35. Qur'an: (2:173) 
-Notes for Chapter IV Page 119 
36. The issue of language will be dealt with shortly. 
37. Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashba/1 wa al-Na:,'ii'ir,. pp.85. 
38. The preoccupation with syllogistic argument is clearly seen in most 
fatwahs dealing with social problems. See, Khalid Mas cud, Trends in 
the Interpretation of Islamic Law as Reflected in the Fatawa Literature 
of the Deoband School: A Study of tl1e Attitudes of the cUlama' of 
Deoband to Certain Social Problems and Inventions. M.A. thesis, In-
stitute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, 1969. Also Mu~ammad 
Shafi\ Alati Jadidah (Karachi, n.d.). 
39. This is the second erroneous assumption under which the instant jurist 
usually labours. 
40. J. Stone, Precedent and Law Dynamics of Common Law Growth (Mel-
bourne, 1985), p.45. 
41. This point will be duly demonstrated when the fatwahs will be 
analysed. 
42. This point is further illustrated in the analysis of the fatwahs on organ 
transplantation. 
43. J. Stone, op.cit., p.45. 
44. Ibid., p.46. 
45. Ibid., p.56. 
46. Ibid., p.50. 
47. Ibid., p.52. 
48. This is a phrase which was coined by the famous jurist Julius Stone. 
49. Ibid., p.58. 
50. Ibid., p.59. 
51. Paul Ricoeur, "What Is a Text? Explanation and Interpretation", in 
David Rasmussen, Mythic-Symbolic Language and Philosophical 
Anthropology: A Constrnctive lllte1pretation of the Thought of Paul 
Ricoeur (Nijhoff: The Hague, 1971), p.138. 
52. Edward Said, The World, the Text, and the Critic (Britain, 1984), p.35. 
53. Ibid., p.4. 
"Each essay in this book affirms the connection between texts and the 
existential actualities of human life, politics, societies and events. 
• 
Notes for Chapter IV Page 120 
The realities of power and authority as well as the resistances offered 
by men, women, and social movements to institutions, authorities, 
orthodoxies, are realities that solicit the attention of critics. I propose 
that these realities are what should be taken account of by criticism 
and the critical consciousness in the recent past." Ibid., p.5. 
54. Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class (Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge, 1980), p 23. 
55. E. Said, op.cit., p.26. 
56. Ibid., p.36. 
57. The Zahiri school derives its name from the Arabic word for clear, 
conspicuous, apparent. This group maintained that the literal meaning 
of the text is what should be followed. Any meaning that is not derived 
from the literal meaning is considered invalid. 
58. Ibid., p.36. 
59. Ibid., p.36. 
60. This is the basis of his thesis in al-Rad ca/a al-N11[1at, ed. Shawqi :payf, 
(Cairo, 1947) 
61. E. Said, op.cit. p.38. 
62. Ibid., p.38. 
63. Ibid., p.38. 
64. Ibid., p.38. 
65. Julius Stone, Law and Social Science (University of Minnesota Press: 
Minneapolis), 1966, p.61. 
An airplane was held in 1931 not to be a "motor vehicle" within the 
Motor Vehicle Theft Act, not because the legislature did not have 
airplanes in mind, but because the community in 1931 did not use and 
understand "motor vehicle" in that way. Ibid, p.107 
66. Ibid., p.63. 
67. Ibid., p.64. 
68. ' Ibid., p.64. 
69. Ibn cAbidin, Nashr a/-cu,f fT Bina Ba c1 al-A{1ka111 ca/a al-curf, p.125. 
70. Stone, Law and the Social Science (Minneapolis, 1966), p.65. 
•. 
I 
I Notes for Chapter IV Page 121 
71. W. Hallaq, "Considerations on the Function and Character of Sunni 
Legal Theory" in Journal of the American Oriental Society. 104.4, 
(1984), p.682 
72. My use of the word "assumed" is not used in the pejorative sense. In 
other words, whether the reasons were in fact those which led to the 
ultimate ruling, does not alter the fact that they were assumed simply 
because there is no recorded textual evidence to support these as-
sumed reasons. Although there may be a few isolated cases of rulings 
accompanied by their rationes, this is not the general trend as we can 
see from the many classical legal works. 
73.. For an elaborate and comprehensive discussion on this topic see, 
W.Zuhayli U{iil al-Fiqh al-Islami, pp.612-652. 
74. lbn cAbidin, op.cit., p.21. 
75. Ibid., pp.17-28. 
76. Ibid., p.22. 
77. Ibid., p.23. 
78. The Azharis saw the facts differently to the Deobandis. 
. 
-
Conclusion Page 122 
Conclusion. 
In my thesis I have attempted to highlight the leeways inherent in the 
concept of stare decisis and I have contrasted them with the traditional 
orthodox pattern of judgment which invariably elects to ignore or 
neglect them. The traditional pattern proceeds as if the outcome is 
decided wholly by the available precedents. My thesis recognizes 
leeways of choice when the authoritative materials offer such leeways, 
and the responsibility of the instant jurist· within those leeways for 
choosing the rule most appropriate for the instant case. 
The jurist must also, however, take into account the disturbance to 
certainty anc,l stability of community expectations which would arise 
from departing from an assumedly binding precedent. It is obvious that 
mere marginal superiority of a new ruling would not suffice to sanction 
departure from the old rule. To warrant displacement by a new ruling, 
the shortfall of the old ruling must be gross enough to outweigh the 
negative effects of disturbing any settled expectations surrounding it. It 
would seem that certain value-preferences based upon community ex-
pectations, while these do not in themselves constitute legal precepts, 
tend to guide and even control the extent to which the ruling jurists are 
prepared to depart from precedent. The problem is that in most modern 
religious societies there tend to be two sets of "received ideals" opera-
tive. The "received ideals" of the orthodox vs the "receive ideals" of the 
modernists. This clash directly influences the judicial process. On the 
one hand, the modernists charge that the "received ideals" of orthodoxy 
are persisting despite changes of circumstances which may have 
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rendered them dysfunctional. On the other hand, orthodoxy charges 
that the "received ideals" of the modernists are an empty assimilation 
of western ideals. This tension constitutes a major problem for the 
jurists, who are themselves split on the issue. Since any ruling is bound 
to incorporate "received ideals" regardless of whether one group ap-
proves of the tendencies of the others', the ruling should attempt to lay 
to rest received ideals which have become dysfunctional, or which have 
been appropriated to the benefit of sectional interests. 
This study does not advocate in any way the undermining of precedent, 
but merely insists that its perspective ambit be adjusted. It recognizes 
the importance of precedent, since, to reduce the complicated exercise 
of judicial decisionmaking to terms. of simple contrast between the 
application of existing legal principles and decision by reference not to 
principles at all, but only to extra-legal propositions, is a gross traversity 
of the dictates of established Islamic legal theory. 
This study should therefore be viewed as an attempt to phase in the 
movement from precepts to other precepts, or from traditionally ac-
cepted precepts to neglected precepts, or from precepts that are too 
• 
narrow to wider precepts, or from single precepts to clusters of 
precepts. Moreover, this study has shown that leeways may arise from 
the nature of the contents of legal precepts, or from competition be-
tween them, and also from certain features of precedent and ratio 
notions themselves, from the existence of vital extra-legal propositions, 
and finally from the fertile nature in which law and all discourse about 
law is packaged. 
The major emphasis of this study has been to show why rigid adherence 
to the doctrine of precedent does not necessarily dictate the particular 
verdict reached by the jurist. There could be, and indeed, there must be 
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a clear introduction into the decisional process of extra-legal premises, 
drawn from the jurist's experience of his contemporary situation. At 
least, if an extra-legal premise is not expressly introduced into the legal 
· arguments, it should operate as a reason for the jurist making one 
choice rather than another within available leeways. 
Jurists cannot afford to ignore the impact of current values on their 
choices within the leeways which the law presents; though how far a 
particular jurist will consciously venture onto this ambitious ground will 
depend largely on personal philosophy and education. Therefore, the 
jurist's experience, his education, technical legal competence, bold-
ness, timidity, ethical standards, must invariably influence his exercise 
of a choice within the leeways. Hence, the present study is, emphatical-
ly, not to advocate judicial choicemaking, but only to note the situations 
in which such choicemaking is unavoidable. We are therefore com-
pelled to recognize how often the precedents ostensibly invoked as 
binding do not compel the decision reached on their basis. 
Citing inadequately reasoned, tenuous dicta, remote or even merely 
verbal analogies and abstract syllogistic deduction, without seriously 
considering the leeways that tend to favour the current social facts, has 
become the hallmark of certain orthodox jurists. What is more, is that 
such a judicial process is not only devoid of any serious consideration 
of such vital leeways in legal choicemaking, but is utterly hostile to such 
considerations. 
On the one hand,. language is the "ubiquitous clothing" of legal 
phenomena; and on. the other hand, logic and other forms of reasoning 
directly affect the way language is worked with and worked on in order 
to keep a legal system viable in the face of constant change on its 
application to the social phenomena it seeks to regulate.* 
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One message of the present work arises from the rapidity of change in 
contemporary societies. It is that jurists and the community must learn 
to acknowledge those inherent features of legal theory which can assist 
in the application of the law in an environment which has undergone 
and is still undergoing a radical technological, economical and 
psychological change. 
* J.Stone, Law and the Social Scienc((!s, p.57 
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cadah: Habit, practice of the people, prevailing i<Jtirar: Compulsion. 
custom. 
amanah: Trust, guardianship. 
caql: Human reason, intellectual faculty. 
asbad al-nuiiil: The occasions of revelation. 
clljl: Primary sources. 
ba_tin: Internal, esoteric. 
<Jariirah: Necessity. 
dariiri: Necessary, a priori, a grade of maslaltah: 
' Indispensible in sustaining the good 
0(111°asa-
li~ ). • 
din: Religion. 
fatwah: Legal decree. 
fiqh: The body of Islamic law. 
ganlJ: Unusual. 
~ajah: General need. 
~aram: Forbidden. 
~ikmah: Wisdom, reason. 
hi/ah: Legal evasion. 
. 
~udiid Allah: Limits of God,penal laws. 
~ukm: Value, practice, law, order. 
cibadat: (Pl. of cibadah) obligations, rituals, wor-
ship. That which aims at the protection of 
religion (din). (Shatibi). 
ijm~: Consensus. 
ijtihad: Independent legal reasoning. 
ikhtiyan: By man's own choice. 
cillah: Motive, reason, cause, ratio legis 
iradah: Intention, will. 
istidlal: Reasoning. 
istihsan:To decide in favour of something which is 
• considered good by the jurist, over against 
the conclusion that may have been reached 
by analogy. 
istinbat: Inference. 
istislah: To decide in favour of something because 
'it is considered good (niafla!rah), and more 
beneficial than any thing decided otherwise. 
A method of interpreting already existing 
rules, by disengaging the spirit of these rules 
from the letter: exceptions and extensions 
are reached which command practical 
Utility and correspond to the fundamental 
goals of the law. 
kasb: Acquisition: 
kayl: measurement. 
khaff Particular. 
kh~tab: Promulgation, proclamation. 
khufbah: Friday sermon delivered in the mosque. 
kulli: Universal. 
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kulliyah: Totality, whole. mutaka/limiin: Scholastic theologians. 
madhhab: School of law. najis: Impure, dirty. 
mafiisid: (Pl. of mafsadah ). naql: Transmission, tradition. 
mafsadah: Opposite of maslahah. 
. . 
naskh: Abrogation. 
maknih: Disliked. ,iaH: Text of the Quran and the Sunnah. 
macna: Meaning, reason. qadi: Judge. 
manat: Anchor, basis of a rule. qaf d: Intention. 
manfac; Benefit, utility. 
man/ii! calayhi: Laws that are directly based upon qawl: View, statement. 
the revealed texts. 
qiyas: Analogy. 
quwwah: Strong and effective. 
maqfid: Intention, goal, end, objective. 
ray: Personal discretion. 
masa/ih: (Pl.of maslahah ). 
. . .. 
sabab: Reason, cause. 
masalik al-cillah: Methods of recognizing the ratio. 
sha,;c-ah: Islamic Law. 
maslahalt: Human good, human interest, human 
• • welfare, public interest, utility, welfare. sha7!: Condition, qualification. 
maslahalt nmrsalalt: A maslaltah not explicitly sup- {ahir: Clean, ritually pure. 
• • ported by the text. • • 
ta{1si11i:"To adopt that which conforms to the best 
mitltaq: An allegorical covenant of practice, and to avoid such manners that 
are disliked by men of wisdom." (Shatibi). 
mufti: Jurisconsult. 
takhsis: Particularization . 
. . 
mujtaltid: One who is qualified to extrapolate laws 
from the primary sources. taknm: Honour and respect. 
mucamalat: Non devotional matters. ta11qi!1 al-manat: Refinement of the basis of the 
ruling. 
mujtahid jilti: Laws based upon individual inter-
pretation taqfid: Adherence to a school of law. 
munasabalt: Suitability. tarfi!1: Judicial preference. 
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taslm-c: Legislating. 
tawqif: Restraint,abstinence. 
cummah: Islamic community 
curf: Prevailing norms, mores. 
uiiil: Legal principle. 
Ufiil al-fiqh: Islamic legal theory. 
wafii: Divine revelation. 
wajib: Compulsory, obligatory. 
wilayah: Trusteeship. 
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wilayah a/-ijba,i: Mandatory trusteeship. 
f"ahir: Apparent, literal. 
zanni: Probable. 
